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JESUS AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF CHRISTIANITY AND COERCION

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BY

A. T. CADOUX, B.A., D.D.

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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

TO THE DEAR AND SACRED MEMORY OF MY FRIENDS

JOSEPH GEORGE ALDRIDGE

ALFRED JENKINS

RONALD SANDERSON

AND

WILLIAM FRANCIS WALKER

WHO WERE KILLED IN THE GREAT WAR

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Jesus and Civil Government

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THERE seems to be need for a better understanding as to what Christianity has to do with coercion.

Jesus said, "Resist not him that is evil," and some people, reasoning from his general teaching and practice, understand that by these words he forbade his followers in any circumstances to offer forcible resistance to the evil-doer. They maintain that moral goodness cannot be furthered by coercion, that when we are faced with evil-doing the chief thing is to win the evil-doer to better ways, and that this can best be done by non-resisting gentleness. And they cite the suffering and death of Jesus as his practice of this principle.

But there are many more who, while they may not be able to reconcile the way of war with the teaching of Jesus, yet recognize occasions when they are convinced that not to fight would be desertion of all that he means to them. And they are confirmed in this conviction by seeing that war is in principle only an extension of the coercion ultimately involved in every act of all civil government, and that without civil government the world would lack the order needful for civilization and

even for Christianity. They are therefore reluctant to accept an interpretation of the teaching of Jesus that makes him condemn an institution like civil government which has rendered and does render so great services to mankind and which they judge to be instrumental to the progress of the kingdom of God.

Many pacifists would deny that their condemnation of coercion condemns civil government, and we shall have to examine this contention later, but it is not to be denied that all existing civil government works characteristically by penalty enforced enactments and that no effective civil government has yet been established without it. Tolstoy saw that anarchy was the correlate of pacifism, and pacifists who deny this logical relationship often betray its existence by their wholesale condemnation of all acts of all governments as unchristian.

The controversy is an old one, but the recent war brought it into a prominence which the so-called peace has rather obscured than diminished, for it revives in a more serious if less acute form when we consider the future. The difference is felt even in the preliminary question as to the very possibility of abolishing war. For if all use of coercion is always wrong, then the continued existence and increasing magnitude of war during so many centuries of Christian teaching is evidence of such deep and widespread and growing blindness and depravity that we may well despair of its abolition. Whereas if there are circumstances in which war is justified then its continuance and development may be due to other causes than moral obtuseness, and we may hope that, if these causes

can be discovered, there is moral soundness enough in the world to alter them and so abolish their present result. The difference becomes more acute when practical measures are considered. Most of those who admit the necessity of coercion are convinced that the elimination of war can be effected only by the establishment of an inter-state court to do for the states of the world what the courts of each state do for its own subjects. But to accomplish this, such an international court must have, as ordinary law courts have, power to enforce its decisions. And to this the man who believes all coercion wrong must object. Hence the pacifist will, if logical, and in fact often does, discredit and oppose any project, such as the League of Nations, that moves in this direction. There is thus a damaging division in the attempt to abolish war.

And there are other ill results of the unsettled state of Christian thought on the use of coercion. For those who are convinced that coercion plays an essential part in the ways of humanity are often made diffident in their efforts for good by being unable to relate this necessity to the teaching of Jesus, so that in any scheme of betterment that involves legislation they suffer from a certain spiritual reservation and miss the full driving power of their religion ; and when, as in 1914, they are convinced that it is right to fight they have either to meet extraordinary demands with their spiritual capital tied up or else to bring it into play by shifts of argument that prove wasteful and de-vitalizing. The uncertainty of Christian thought in this respect may be measured by comparing the present utterances of ministers of religion as to what they will do in the event of another war with

the assurance and inspiration with which in 1914 they urged enlistment as a sacred duty.

A further disadvantage exemplifies what always happens when an occasion brings two apparently incompatible judgments into contiguity: unless they can be intelligibly related the mind begins to lose hold of one of them. So that when a man sees coercion to be in any way necessary but fails to relate this need to the teaching of Jesus even though he may believe that there is a connection could he but find it, his failure to do so tends to induce an underground suspicion that the teaching of Jesus is not practicable, and this weakens the authority and motive power of his religion.

And in this connection we may note that in so far as it is insistently and confidently proclaimed that Jesus forbade all coercion, just so far will those (and they are the vast majority of mankind) who are convinced that under the present conditions life cannot be ordered without coercion be therefore inclined to conclude that Christianity is impracticable. It has been stated that in certain circles of Continental thought the Tolstoian interpretation of Christianity found acceptance because it provided grounds for denying the practicability of Jesus' teaching. So that to Christians who are convinced that a certain amount of coercion is not only inevitable but helpful, an interpretation of Christianity that condemns all coercion must appear as a stumbling block in the way of their religion's advance.

Many attempts from both sides have been made to bridge the difference.

From the pacifist side it is sometimes suggested that there is a spiritual or moral force which,

had we whole-heartedness and faith enough, we could use on those occasions when it seems as though we ought not to allow some iniquitous and cruel proceeding. They remind us that at Nazareth Jesus passed untouched through a violent crowd and in Gethsemane awed his captors into retreat. Undoubtedly there is such a power and evidently Jesus possessed it. But even in him it had its limits: it was not ultimately effective against capture and death; and if it is said, "That was because Jesus did not choose to use it for these things," the reply must be that if it is a God-given way of staying men from evil every man is morally bound to use it to the extent of its effectiveness. We cannot hope to be able to use this power more effectually than Jesus, and though we might be content to abide by its limits where our own safety was concerned, what are we to do when it proves insufficient to protect others? The rejoinder may be made, "We are not responsible for consequences: we must obey and have faith in God for the result." But this begs the question. Consequences are certainly not the only criterion of right, yet we can ignore them only when we are perfectly certain of other grounds for action, which in this case would mean that we were perfectly certain as to Jesus' meaning on the matter, which is precisely the question at issue.

It must also be considered that this so-called moral force, in so far as it is distinct from moral persuasion, is not really moral in any sense that distinguishes it from physical force. We can preserve the distinction between moral and physical force only by regarding the former as that which makes a man refrain from a deed by seeing and

feeling the evil of it. It is not enough that he fears a non-physical greatness which he does not understand ; for that may be only superstition, and is so unless he recognizes the moral quality of the greatness, in which case moral "conviction" is the exact word rather than moral "force." So that to ask for a "moral force" which shall make the evil-doer desist when an appeal to his reason and conscience has failed is to ask for a force that cannot be relied upon to be effective, and, in any case, is not really moral.

It will be seen, too, that this so-called moral force when available would work precisely as physical force when used for moral ends and quite otherwise than moral persuasion. It would not (as moral suasion does) attempt to prevent the deed by changing the heart, but (as in morally used physical force) would hope to change the heart by preventing the deed.

There are some who, while allowing a difference between what Jesus taught and did and what they think right for soldier and judge and policeman to do, explain the difference by making it depend upon a distinction between the spiritual and temporal. Now it is clear enough that in many cases a man, to be efficient in a certain particular service to the world, must be released from other services, but more than this seems to be meant by the distinction in question, for otherwise the difference between the methods of Jesus and what is right for the soldier would be merely one of circumstance, and there would be no need to appeal to the difference between the temporal and spiritual. But to mean more than this is to argue that it may be right to pursue temporal aims and to employ in their

pursuit a certain sort of action which is unlawful for the man who is devoted to spiritual aims, and this implies that the rightness of temporal ends does not lie in their relation to spiritual ends ; which dethrones the spiritual and divides the moral into two unrelated parts. Of any such distinction there is no trace in the life and teaching of Jesus, the whole bent of which was to emphasize the oneness of the spiritual and temporal. The uselessness of such a doctrine in solving the problem before us is visible when we ask whether, if he were in any concrete situation in which temporal ends are held to justify the use of coercion, Jesus the carpenter would have acted differently from Jesus the teacher. Or we might ask, " If an able-bodied clergyman finds a fellow-citizen being maltreated by roughs, and expostulations fail, is he to leave the man to his fate? Or if not, how does his act differ from that of a soldier defending his country? "

It is not necessary here to give minute attention to the much-discussed theory that the moral teaching of Jesus is an interim ethic, i.e., that he expected a speedy end of the world, and that this expectation made his moral precepts different from what they would otherwise have been ; for this theory is obsolescent, and those to whom it is still acceptable will not be troubled by any difficulties as to the carrying out of his moral teaching. We need remark only two things. In the whole of the Sermon on the Mount, although the motive of the moral injunctions is sometimes given, there is no hint at all of the expectation of a rapidly approaching end. And then, although such an expectation would affect some moral ques-

tions, such as certain aspects of a man's relationship towards marriage or property, it is clear that it would have no effect upon most of the moral teaching of Matt. v-vii, such as that upon anger, adultery, swearing, and loving our enemies. And upon the question of non-resistance, though it might conceivably have some influence where property was concerned, it is to be noted that in the three examples which Jesus gives in Matt. v. 38-41, it would make little difference to the gravity of the injury whether the end of the world was coming in a year or not for a thousand years.

Perhaps the commonest attitude on the matter amongst people who consider themselves more orthodox than those holding the opinion just referred to is one that is in some ways the converse of it. Instead of holding that the ethics of Jesus are inapplicable to us because he shaped them in view of an expected event that did not happen, these people hold that he did not intend them to be entirely applicable until a certain event had happened, and that this event is still in the future. They hold that much of the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, especially that in regard to non-resistance, is intended to apply to an ideal state and not to be applicable, or at least fully applicable, in the present imperfect condition of the world. It is difficult to criticize such a view because it is difficult to see what it means. It seems to say, When there are no more evil-doers, then you may adopt Jesus' method of dealing with them, or at least you must postpone the use of his way with them until they have ceased to be a really serious problem. It is quite certain that Jesus intended his teaching about anger and purity and love of

enemies for immediate application, and there is no reason to suppose that it was otherwise with non-resistance. Indeed, the very form of his words (Matt. v. 39-41) shows that he had in mind a world where law courts were still a necessity and where personal insult and compulsory service were still possible. Nor can we cite, as another supposed instance of the sort, the command to leave all or to sell all and give to the poor, and argue that under present circumstances it would not be right for all Christians to abandon their property ; for Jesus did not demand this condition of all, and when he did demand it, it was not as something possible only in an ideal society but as something that he expected to be done then and there, and those who accepted his command found it both possible and effective for good.

It is sometimes said that our imperfect lives have so entangled us that we are committed to certain ways of action which, though not in harmony with the teaching of Jesus, can be avoided only at the cost of committing some worse evil, such as breaking faith, a situation from which the perfection of Jesus' life withheld him. But, whatever his own life may have been, his teaching was for imperfect men, not essentially less entangled in the world's ways than we are ; and if entanglement is a valid plea and his teaching took no account of it, he is no teacher for us.

Those who followed the pacifist controversy to which the war gave rise cannot have failed to perceive that Christendom had never thoroughly thought out the relationship of the teaching of Jesus to such use of coercion as is involved in civil government. So far as the discussion turned

upon reasoning from the generally accepted estimate of the teaching and practice of Jesus, there is little doubt that the pacifist had the best of it. At least so it seemed to the writer. The defence of the common point of view had to rely almost entirely upon insisting that a thorough application of pacifist tenets would involve inconsistencies and disaster, but since it is not likely that any life will be entirely free from the former or any war from the latter, such arguments were not decisive. And the course of the controversy made it evident that the stress of war conditions did not allow the Church to overtake its arrears of thinking on this insistent problem.

The writer's sympathy with the pacifist position, coupled with his inability to deny the force of the objections to it, compelled him in the years that followed the war to re-examine both the teaching of Jesus as to coercion and the part that coercion plays and has played in the moral development of the race. The results of that attempt are offered as a contribution to the settlement of a problem which, while unsettled, confuses Christian effort over the whole province of civil government, and especially in all attempt to abolish or diminish war.

CHAPTER II

THE TEACHING OF JESUS ON COERCION

(1)

OUR first task is to examine the teaching of Jesus, and we must begin with Matt. v. 38-42 (Luke vi. 29, 30). This consists of two parts :—

(a) A reference to ancient practice and a general, abstract correction, (verse 38) “Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth :” (verse 39a) “but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil.”

(b) Three very concrete examples of conduct (verses 39b-41) : “But whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain.” And upon these follow two more general injunctions (verse 42), “Give to him that asketh of thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.”

It must be noted that (a) is the only recorded saying of Jesus that directly and generally enjoins non-resistance, and that it is found only in the First Gospel. This raises the question whether it may not be after all a part of the editorial frame-

work constructed to give form to a collection of the sayings of Jesus, and the following considerations must be borne in mind :—

(1) Luke in vi. 29, 30 has the equivalent of Matt. v. 39b, 40, 42, but omits Matt. v. 38, 39a. His omission of the reference to the ancient dictum is explicable, because he was writing for Gentiles, to whom comparisons with Jewish law were not interesting. But why should he omit, “Resist not him that is evil,” if it was in his source?

(2) Luke’s parallel shows that “Give to him that asketh of thee, etc.” (Luke vi. 30a, Matt. v. 42) was an integral part of the group of sayings at the head of which Matthew has, “Resist not him that is evil,” which generalization is not applicable to the beggar.

(3) The injuries instanced in Matt. v. 39b-41 are trivial compared with the loss of an eye. So prefaced, the examples that Jesus gives appear to avoid the real seriousness of his demand, and this is not in his manner.

(4) “An eye for an eye” speaks of punishment for an act when it is done ; Jesus’ examples consider only resistance to an act in the doing.

(5) In the Old Testament “An eye for an eye” is spoken not to the injured man, but always to those responsible for the order and protection of society (see Exod. xxi. 24, Lev. xxiv. 20, Deut. xix. 19-21), whereas in the examples given Jesus addresses the injured man only. The Old Testament citation therefore concerns quite a different sphere of duty and responsibility from that of the sayings to which it is here prefixed. Nor can we understand Jesus to be citing scripture merely in description of a revengeful spirit, for the analogy

of Matt. v. 21, 27 and 33 with Matt. v. 38 compels us, if we take them as his own words, to read them all as intended to refer to the law as such.

These considerations, if they do not warrant us in definitely concluding that Matt. v. 38, 39a are the work of an editor, certainly compel us to look rather to the concrete examples of verses 39b-41 for the discovery and definition of Jesus' meaning.

In any case, everyone agrees that, "Resist not him that is evil," must be taken with some limitations: if the evil man tempts me to do wrong, no one will deny that I ought to resist him. So that apart from any doubt as to the authenticity of this general, negative command, the importance of the question as to the limits of its scope makes it secondary in significance to the concrete commands that follow, for they give the only indication that we have in the teaching of Jesus as to the limits that he had in mind.

And when we come to consider the three examples that Jesus gives we see at once that a certain limitation commonly read into "Resist not him that is evil" was not in his mind. For the ordinary pacifist interpretation is that we must not resist by physical force, but that we may resist by words; whereas it is quite clear that in Matt. v. 39-41 both acts and words of resistance are forbidden. Jesus bids the injured man freely offer more than is demanded, and certainly the form and spirit of his words exclude verbal protest. It is to be noted that in New Testament use the word here translated "resist" denotes opposition in the widest sense and is often used to resistance by words only.

It is very significant that all three of the examples given by Jesus belong to one and the same class of injury. In all three cases the damage done or threatened is confined to the man addressed, and further is not of such a nature as to be likely to incapacitate him in the discharge of responsibilities to those depending upon him. This must be understood in the light of Jesus' common practice of giving extreme instances (Matt. v. 21, 22, 27, 28, xviii. 8, 9, etc.). If he intended the method to be used where the interests of a third party were at stake, it is more than strange that, of the three instances he gives, not one covers such cases.

But we further mark that in all three cases the conduct enjoined is very different from mere non-resistance : in each case the person addressed is bidden to supply the evil-doer with more of what he seeks by his evil deed. If we translate the latter part of the saying from the concrete to the abstract the whole command would run, "Resist not him that is evil, but co-operate with him"; and it becomes perfectly clear that such action would be right only on a strictly limited sort of occasion, i.e., where the damage concerns none but the injured disciple himself.

It seems therefore certain that if "Resist not him that is evil" are the words of Jesus, he had in mind only those cases in which no third party was involved. If we suppose him to have intended them to apply universally, then, since he instanced only cases where no third party was involved, he was masking the real difficulty of his teaching, which was not his way. So that if taken as his words, "Resist not him that is evil" must be

read in closest conjunction with their sequel : they are the negative and abstract preliminary to the positive and concrete clauses that follow them, and there is no reason for supposing that they are intended to be applicable where the latter are not, i.e., that they are any more than an instance of the common Hebrew way of stating a proposition both negatively and positively, non-resistance being necessarily the negative counterpart of co-operation.

That Jesus intended the injunctions of Matt. v. 38-41 to be limited to cases where no third party was concerned finds confirmation in his life. We have seen that this passage, where applicable, forbids resistance by word as well as deed, but Jesus resisted the Pharisees by word because the spiritual welfare of Israel was at stake, and the scarifying stroke of his speech shows the artificiality of a distinction between verbal and forcible resistance, for there are few men who would not rather receive a blow than be spoken to as Jesus spoke to the Pharisees. When arrested, he did not proffer his captors more than they asked, but according to John xviii. 8 pleaded, "Let these go their way." The same authority tells us that at his examination (John xviii. 22, 23) Jesus, being struck, did not turn the other cheek, evidently because the truth was at stake. And at his trial he did not give answers when they were demanded.

In this connection much has been made of Jesus' cleansing of the Temple. On the one hand it has been rightly contended that the whip of small cords of which the Fourth Gospel tells us (ii. 15) was used only to drive the cattle and that the statement, he "*cast out* them that sold and

bought" (Mark xi. 15) does not necessarily imply violence, the word being frequently used in connections where there certainly was none. But when it is contended that Jesus must here have used moral force only since it was impossible for one man by physical force to clear the Temple courts, the real point is obscured. It is probable that on this occasion Jesus did use what is commonly called "moral force," but the incident confirms our earlier conclusion that the power so named is not, strictly speaking, a moral one, for there is little doubt that in so far as the majesty of his presence was effective to the end he sought, those who in this instance were moved by it obeyed, not because they were convinced that his command was righteous and were moved to act by the conviction, but because they feared a greatness they did not understand. But it is clear that, even so, "moral force" does not account for the whole of what was done. For on this basis how do we account for his overthrowing of "the tables of the money-changers and the seats of them that sold doves" (Mark xi. 15)? The buyers and sellers evidently went not by persuasion, but reluctantly. Had the effective motive been even awe for the ill-understood greatness of Jesus, they would have gone with their wares at his command and no action of his would have been needed. It seems on general grounds certain that the cleansing of the Temple was possible only because Jesus was at the height of his popularity, and because the action itself was popular. Mark xi. 18 tells us that the chief priests and scribes regarded Jesus' popularity as the power that enabled him to do this daring act, and certainly in their own

case it was not his moral ascendancy, but fear of the people, that held their hands from resisting him forcibly. It was probably, therefore, fear of the multitude that was the effective force in removing the traders from the Temple court. And there can be little doubt that Jesus recognized the existence of this factor and used it. He reckoned (Mark xi. 27 ff.) on the chief priests' fear of the multitude to sharpen one point of the dilemma to which he drives them by his question about the Baptist. And in Mark xii. 12 we read, "And they sought to lay hold on him ; and they feared the multitude" ; and Jesus can hardly have been unwitting of the nature of the shield under which he continued for a time, and which he made the more effective by his nightly departure from the city (Mark xi. 19), thus compelling his opponents, if they took action against him, to do so in the presence of the multitude. There can be no reasonable doubt that in these days Jesus relied upon the priestly fear of mob violence (Mark xiv. 2), and that in so doing he was concerned with something other than his own personal safety.

The bearing of other sayings of Jesus upon those of Matt. v. 38-41 will be treated later, but we may here consider that of the adjacent section, Matt. v. 43-48. For though in the former Jesus says nothing of the motive on which he expects the disciple to act, we can hardly be wrong in thinking that he intended the same motive to rule throughout both, and in the latter he gives it—"that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven : for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the

just and the unjust." It is to be marked here that the undifferentiating love of God which man is told to make his ideal is that which is seen working through the laws of nature. But nature brings not comfort and safety only: she brings suffering, disablement, and death also; and it is certain that Jesus would not have confined the operations of God in nature to those that make for man's bodily welfare, nor have seen in those that brought damage and death a disproof of God's love. So that action upon the motive which Jesus here gives certainly would not suggest that the love enjoined must never use means involving bodily damage.

It is sometimes argued that, since Jesus did not organize a forcible rescue for the Baptist, he must have intended by "Resist not him that is evil" to forbid forcible resistance even where a third person was concerned. It is true we are not told that Jesus made any attempt by force to release John, but neither are we told that he attempted to persuade Herod to it by words; indeed, we know that he did not, for Herod saw him first, long after John's death (Luke xxiii. 8). So that to make Jesus' action with respect to John regulative of the non-resistance command would be to make it forbid all resistance even by word to those who are wronging their fellows and ours. But there are other considerations quite sufficient to explain the action of Jesus in this matter. A forcible attempt to rescue John would have made all further work in Herod's dominions impossible. Mark hints that Herod's suspicions were amongst the factors that ultimately terminated Jesus' work in Galilee (cf. Mark iii. 6, vi. 14-16, viii. 11-

15). And Josephus (*Ant.*, XVIII. v. 2) tells us that Herod killed John because he feared a popular rising, which is not incompatible with Mark's account of the Baptist's imprisonment and death, for if he publicly insisted that Herod was living in open defiance of the law, a popular movement against Herod might easily have resulted. These considerations explain sufficiently why Jesus did not try to persuade Herod to release John, for it would have roused Herod's antagonism at the very beginning of the Galilean ministry, and would have hastened the conclusion that, as it was, came all too soon.

We may here also notice two arguments frequently used to show that Jesus disapproved of all forcible resistance.

We are told that it is impossible to think of Jesus as using physical coercion or as doing anything that would damage the limb or life of another. But an appeal of this sort to the imagination cannot be regarded as determinative. If it had not been recorded that Jesus "overthrew the tables of the money-changers and the seats of them that sold doves," or that he said of Herod, "Go and say to that fox," many people would have said that they could not think of him as speaking or acting thus. And, on the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which many people would find it difficult to think that Jesus would not forcibly resist an evil-doer unless they supposed him to have at command powers that we have not, in which case his example is of course no guide for us. In any case the argument that we must believe Jesus to have condemned what we cannot without irreverence imagine him

doing is shown to be fallacious when we consider his attitude to marriage.

Then we are reminded of the attitude of the early Christian Church toward participation in war. The argument runs thus: Jesus himself used no weapons, and we find a large section, probably the majority, if not the whole, of the early Church for a long time condemning the use of weapons by Christians, therefore it is probable that an interpretation of Jesus' teaching which justifies this attitude is correct. But a precisely similar argument might be constructed to justify the early Church's exaltation of the unmarried state, a movement which was more widespread and emphatic, which began earlier and lasted longer, than its condemnation of the use of arms, and which also could appeal to the practice and teaching of Jesus (Matt. xix. 12). In understanding this early Christian attitude towards military service certain facts must be taken into account:—

(1) Until the time when we do actually find Christian legionaries, the state of the Empire was such that peace and order could be maintained by a comparatively small force which the non-Christian majority was quite sufficient to supply, so that the Christians were never faced with the alternative of having either to undertake military service or to accept the responsibility of leaving the state without sufficient force to keep order within or repulse savage invasion. In these circumstances the natural Christian repugnance to violence would assert itself.

(2) The world-renouncing and ascetic element in the early Church, which showed itself in the exaltation of celibacy over marriage and in

monasticism generally, carried with it a disregard of the essential social institutions of life, so that civic and governmental interests and duties played little practical part in the spiritual ideal. The question as to whether order could be maintained without the coercion in which they refused to participate was not a serious one to those whose ideal was the celibate ascetic and martyr.

This ascetic element in the early Church, which was thus closely allied to its attitude on military service, was not drawn from its Founder. It is one of the foreign elements that soon invaded the Church. And it must be noted that the pacifist interpretation of the teaching of Jesus does not appear in the first generation of the followers of Jesus. The book of Acts gives more than one case of soldiers accepting Christianity, but has no suggestion that they were required to drop their profession or were disheartened in continuing it. The Pauline and other epistles have no hint of such a requirement, and amongst the many problems of early Christian conduct with which Paul's letters deal we find none suggesting the existence of a demand which, had it existed, could not have failed to raise many problems. Paul himself has no hesitation in collaborating with his military protectors (Acts xxiii. 17) nor in appealing to Caesar (Acts xxv. 11).

Before passing to the consideration of other passages of Jesus' teaching we may note the following facts, which have an indirect but significant bearing upon the question, and make it difficult to think that Jesus enjoined entire abstinence from coercion:—

(1) An injunction so contrary to common notions

of right, if it had a place in his teaching at all, could hardly fail to have a prominent place: its actual place is in a disputed interpretation of one saying. And where Jesus forbids or repudiates the use of arms as in Gethsemane or before Pilate he gives special reasons, which suggest that he did not hold the use of them wrong in itself.

(2) To us such an injunction at once rouses many and great difficulties, yet we are never told that the disciples, who so often found difficulties in Jesus' teaching, made this a matter of question.

(3) Had the narrator of the healing of the centurion's servant (Matt. viii. 5-13, Luke vii. 1-9) held that Jesus condemned his trade, or had Jesus really done so, must not that condemnation have appeared somewhere in the story to temper Jesus' unique praise of this soldier?

(4) The condemnation of coercion would have been the condemnation of the whole system of penalties embodied in the Mosaic law. But while many points of Jesus' teaching and practice with regard to the law were made the subject of scribal attack, this point is never brought against him. The only occasion (John vii. 53—viii. 11) on which Mosaic penalties are made the material of an attack upon him shows clearly that his opponents did not understand him to condemn all penalization, while if he really thought all infliction of penalty wrong in itself his reply is misleading. The case, however, is not so simple as it at first appears.

If we confine ourselves to the information given in the story, we should take it that the scribes and Pharisees selected a case in which they thought that the compassion of Jesus would make him

condemn the law. And they could hardly have thought this unless there already existed a certain body of common feeling against the harshness of this penalty. So that even if Jesus upheld the law here he would be doing so upon an unpopular point. If this was their thought, it is quite clear that they did not understand Jesus to condemn all penalization, for had they done so the choice of a special case that made strong appeal to compassion would have been unnecessary. They would have brought before him a case where his condemnation of the law would have been one in which he would have had no popular sympathy.

But the story is complicated by our knowledge that at this period Rome had forbidden the Jews to inflict capital punishment. The precise terms of this prohibition we do not know, but the story of the death of Jesus suggests that the Jews were able in certain cases to get the Roman governor to carry out the sentence which they themselves lacked power to inflict ; and they would probably have little difficulty in doing so in the case of so customary a penalty as that of death for adultery. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that John viii. 1-11 presupposes that the death penalty for adultery was still in force, for if the scribes themselves were tolerating the abrogation of this law they would not have made it a point on which to challenge Jesus. We have also to note in this connection that death by stoning was prescribed by the law only in the case of adultery under special and therefore rare circumstances, which case the scribes chose for their attack, apparently because, though death under sentence from the Roman Governor would

fulfil the law where the penalty was simply death, the fulfilment of the law where stoning was commanded would involve the infliction of death by the Jewish multitude, which was defiance of Rome.

In this connection again we see that if the scribes had understood Jesus to condemn all penalization, they could have had no hope of involving him in disobedience of Rome by his sanction of the penalty, while the fact that in this case obedience to the law was defiance of Rome would have provided him with an obvious means of avoiding the dilemma: it would have suited their purpose much better to choose a case in which the penalty was not forbidden by Rome.

That the point in question was one of death by stoning explains Jesus' answer. It is sometimes argued that in the words, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her," Jesus condemns all penalty on the ground that sinners have no right to punish sinners. But if Jesus did condemn all penalty it could not have been on this ground, for he goes on to say, "Neither do I condemn thee." Jesus' reply to the scribes therefore does not give his own attitude towards penalty, but points them to an inconsistency in theirs. The significance of stoning as distinct from other forms of death was that it was carried out not by the authorities, but by the people themselves, and was thus a personal expression of reprobation and abhorrence on the part of those participating: hence the point of Jesus' reply. The primitive horror at the breaking of taboo was no longer possible, and it was hypocrisy for any but the utterly pure

to demand to be sanctioned in an act whose very essence was that it expressed personal and utter abhorrence of impurity. Unless we take it so, it is difficult to see why Jesus' questioners found themselves so completely silenced, for had they understood him to mean that none but the sinless ought ever to punish they would surely not have found themselves without answer to a proposition that condemned so much of the law and was full of such great practical difficulties.

We are not told why Jesus said, "Neither do I condemn thee," but we do not need to be. If we recognize not only the harshness of the penalty but that all civilized peoples have ceased to impose any penalty for adultery, and that the penalization of it depended ultimately on the assumption that the wife was the chattel of the husband, it seems inevitable that Jesus should disown the infliction of the prescribed, or any other, penalty for this sin. But this, of course, implies no diminution in his moral condemnation of the act.

(5) The authorities of Jerusalem did not know Jesus as a pacifist, otherwise why should they have feared a popular disturbance on his behalf (Mark xiv. 2)? And it is stranger still that Judas should have secured so formidable a guard to arrest one whom he knew to condemn all forcible resistance.

(2)

"Again, the devil taketh him unto an exceeding high mountain, and showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them; and he said

unto him, All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me. Then saith Jesus unto him, Get thee hence, Satan : for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve" (Matt. iv. 8-10; Luke iv. 5-8).

The temptation of Jesus must evidently be understood in the light of his experience at baptism: the voice that said, "Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased," was followed "straightway" by the Spirit which drives him into the wilderness (Mark i. 11-13). It is generally understood that the voice tells us of the entry into the consciousness of Jesus of the conviction that he was the Son of God in the sense of being the Messiah, or of his final and conscious acceptance of that vocation. This acceptance of Messiahship brought the imperative necessity of thinking out all that was implied in it, and all that was needful for its accomplishment; hence the immediate retreat to the solitude of the wilderness. And thus the temptations represent suggestions which came in the wake of this new experience, but which Jesus put by because he saw that whatever attractions they might offer, they involved disloyalty to God.

Jesus would have to consider the Messianic thought of his day. And the temptation in which from the mountain-top he saw all the kingdoms of the world is generally understood to refer to the Jewish expectation of a warrior Messiah who would dominate the world by arms, a suggestion which Jesus put by, not as impossible, but as wrong. And the pacifist argues that the temptation turns upon the use of weapons for the purposes

of the kingdom of God, and that Jesus' rejection of the temptation is an illustration and instance of his repudiation and condemnation of all coercion. But there are certain grave objections to this interpretation :—

(1) If it was the use of arms that Jesus repudiated in this temptation, and if he did so because he held all use of them wrong, we cannot account for the occurrence of this temptation at this point in his life. If he already held all use of weapons wrong and incapable of producing good, how should he now, in the moment of self-dedication as God's Messiah, be tempted to resort to them? To insist that the temptation turned upon the use of arms is to imply that Jesus could have had no settled conviction that the use of them was in all cases wrong.

(2) If the gist of the temptation was the use of arms then we must understand that that is what is signified by falling down and worshipping the devil,—to use arms would be to acknowledge and compromise with the power by which the devil reigns in the kingdoms of the world. But this interpretation implies that Jesus accepted the claim of the devil not only as an expression of fact, since all the kingdoms of the world did as a matter of fact use arms, but that he also accepted it, in the sense in which Luke (iv. 6) gives it,—“It hath been delivered unto me”—as a matter of right, since without coercion the kingdoms of the world could not have existed. Now it is in itself unlikely that Jesus thought of the devil as having any such authorized place in the kingdoms of the world, and it is highly improbable that when he narrated the temptation he intended the

devil to be understood to be speaking the truth. And, besides, to understand the devil's claim as being based upon the use of arms is to dissever the temptation from the popular expectation in which apparently it arose, for, whatever rights the Jew might accord to the devil in Gentile kingdoms, no Jew would accept such a claim as including Israel, and yet Israel had used arms and would gladly use them again. The reply of Jesus, "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve," is moreover an explicit repudiation of the devil's claim.

(3) The reply of Jesus certainly does not suggest that the wrong to which he was tempted was the use of arms. It is quite evident from his words that to him the evil in the temptation was not the use of wrong means to his end, but rather something which impugned that conviction of God's sovereignty upon which his undertaking was grounded.

These considerations compel us to seek another interpretation. The tempter asked for an act as following from an assumption. Now unless that assumption was one that could not be challenged, the real temptation must have been to accept it, and the act that followed from it was only subsidiary. The assumption was that the evil one had a right and a place in the world, and what he asked for,—to "fall down and worship me,"—involves an acknowledgment of this assumption. And Jesus repudiated his demand as one that challenged the sovereignty of God. So that whatever might be the particular act or line of action to which he was thus tempted Jesus rejected it not as evil in itself, but as implying an acceptance

of the devil's claim and an acknowledgment of his rights in the world.

The temptation then was to regard the kingdoms of the world as belonging to the devil. There can be little doubt that Jesus found this notion in the common Messianic thought of his day (see, e.g., A. H. McNeile's *The Gospel according to St. Matthew*, p. 41). To the Jew the kingdom of God was opposed by the kingdoms of the world. Much of the expectation of the Messiah and of the Kingdom found its motive in Israel's repugnance to political subjection. The conquering Gentile represented triumphant evil under which the righteous must groan for a time. So the Jew regarded the power of the Gentile kingdoms as that of the devil, an idea which justified and demanded a warrior Messiah who should destroy them and assume their power. These kingdoms being essentially evil could not be made subservient to the kingdom of God and must be smashed. Jesus' reply therefore was not a refusal to use arms because their use was in itself wrong: it was a repudiation of the assumption which in this case demanded their use.

We are not expressly told in the story of the temptation that the concrete action to which yielding would have led was the use of organized force, but it is probable that it was so, and if so we are met by interesting results. Common Jewish thought explained the dominance of the Gentile kingdoms as due to the power of the devil. But there can be little doubt that Jesus, with his supremely sane loyalty to fact, saw that what his fellows regarded as the power of the devil was simply the power of effectively organized arms,

and that therefore in the popular programme (which seems to have been the base of the temptation), they hoped to supersede what they called, when in Gentile hands, the power of the devil by themselves using the very power they so named. Hence the strange form of the temptation,—to supersede Satan by acknowledging him.

This interpretation helps us to understand how the claim of the devil could ever form a temptation to the mind of Jesus. For the devil's claim to a right in the kingdoms of the world is apparently the temptation to acknowledge that they cannot exist without something essentially evil. And if that something was the use of organized force in war, it was something essential to the very existence of all that was meant by a kingdom of the world and was also something to which the nature of Jesus must have had the strongest repugnance and which he would therefore be strongly inclined to count as in itself evil. It would seem, then, that if we are to think of this temptation as in any way connected with the use of arms, Jesus was in it faced with the real point of the pacifist problem,—that however repugnant the use of coercion may be, it is an essential element in all actual civil governments, and if it is in itself evil, then they are evil, despite the necessary place they play in the world. And Jesus' answer was to deny that they were essentially evil: he did not admit the devil's claim.

Jesus saw that there was only one sense in which his countrymen's assumption that the kingdoms of the world were the devil's could be brought into relation with facts, and that was by

regarding the use of force as essentially evil, in which case a warrior Messiah was a contradiction in terms, for he would owe his victory to the devil. But the form of the temptation and Jesus' answer show that he denied the assumption, implying that though he recognized the use of organized force as essential to civil governments he denied that they were therefore essentially evil and so of the devil.

It may perhaps seem that we are reading into these few verses more than is warranted, but the temptation certainly touched the relationship of the kingdoms of the world to the kingdom of God, and no practical consideration of this problem could have avoided the points we have dealt with. And we shall find in other sayings of Jesus a good deal to corroborate the following elements of the conclusion arrived at in considering his account of this temptation :—

(1) That Jesus recognized coercion as an essential element in civil government ; and

(2) That nevertheless he regarded civil government as contributory to the kingdom of God.

But before we go further we must note that the story of the temptations must have been auto-biographical, and in the temptation of the mountain-top we have almost our only indication of the form under which Jesus thought of the world beyond Israel, and the picture of his mind, as he gave it, is not of a world-crowd of individual men and women, but of their achieved civic development in the kingdoms of the world, which is an indication of the importance he saw in this aspect of human life. The more vulgar idea of a warrior Messiah who by human or angelic armies

should crush and destroy the Gentiles could never in any way have appealed to Jesus or constituted a temptation to him, but an appreciation of the powers of government for the common good may well have made him ask whether it was not as emperor of the world that he could best save the world. So that the very form of this temptation seems to indicate that Jesus saw in government a way to good whose importance and possibilities were second only to the way that he ultimately chose.

In the present state of New Testament criticism the Fourth Gospel cannot be claimed as unquestionable evidence for the sayings of Jesus, but it is generally allowed that it has some historic basis, which is of greater value in some parts of the book than in others. In the parts dealing with the death of Jesus that value is at a maximum : the Gospel is here very close to the synoptic tradition, and in one point of difference—the day of crucifixion—is by many scholars thought to be more correct. And it is here that we find two passages bearing upon our problem.

(1) In John xviii. 36 we read that Jesus said to Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world : if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews : but now is my kingdom not from hence," which implies that he recognized the use of arms as essential to the maintenance of authority in any actual civil government, and that a kingdom of the world could not exist without it. If Jesus condemned all use of coercion he is here masking his conviction, for in that case his servants would abstain from fighting not because of the nature

of his kingdom but because all use of weapons was wrong, and surely if he had held this view, now, when he was face to face with the representative of the most effective organization of force in his world, was the time when he must in loyalty to truth have given it utterance.

(2) In John xix. 11 Jesus speaks again to Pilate, "Thou wouldest have no power against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath greater sin." It is to be noted here that just because a man has power Jesus does not recognize that power as given from above: he does not recognize the power of him "that delivered me" as "from above," and in this respect he distinguishes it from Pilate's power, which is "from above." Now Pilate's power differed from that of him "that delivered me" by being the governmental power of coercion, and therefore it is this specifically that Jesus recognized as "given from above"; that is, he recognizes the exercise of coercion for governmental purposes as part of the divine will. This saying of Jesus is therefore in close agreement with Rom. xiii. 1-4: Jesus, no less than Paul, regarded the power of civil government as divinely given in a sense that could not be applied to every possession of power.

It is true that Jesus marked the defects of contemporary governments and satirized the gullibility of their subjects (Mark x. 42, 44, Luke xxii. 25, 26). And it is sometimes held that the words, "Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles lord it over them. . . . But it is not so among you . . ." are an instance of Jesus' condemnation of coercion used in govern-

ment. But this seems to miss the point, for, if this was Jesus' meaning, why should he specify the Gentiles, since Jewish governments, too, used coercion? Jesus is clearly pointing to something which his hearers recognized as characteristic of Gentile rulers and condemned in them; and that could certainly not be the use of coercion which was part of their own law; it was rather the use of regal power for selfish ambition without consideration for the good of the governed—a consideration always dominant in the Jewish ideal of kingship. And the point of Jesus' reference to the rulers of the Gentiles is that in quarrelling over precedence his disciples were guilty of precisely what they condemned in others. That the gravamen of Jesus' condemnation was not the use of coercion, but the spirit of vainglorious ambition, is shown by the occasion—there was no danger of the disciples coming to blows over the matter, but the wrong spirit was only too much in evidence. And then, too, the satire of Luke xxii. 25, "They that have authority over them are called Benefactors," does not describe the mind of those who feel the pressure of coercion but rather the popular response to successful ambition, however selfish.

The incident told in Mark xii. 13-17 (Matt. xxii. 15-22, Luke xx. 19-26), in which Jesus is asked to say whether tribute should or should not be paid to Caesar, is very interesting because it raises directly the question of Jesus' attitude towards government. We notice first that the way in which Jesus enjoined payment of tribute to Caesar throws light upon his meaning in Matt. v. 38-41, for had he there intended to forbid all coercion, then, since to pay tribute to Caesar was to support

a power based on coercion, he could have commended payment only on the ground that the demand for tribute, though evil, must not be resisted, whereas he approves payment not on the principle of non-resistance to evil but as a matter of giving Caesar what is his right. And we have also to note that Jesus' questioners evidently did not understand him to be a pacifist or they would not have found his reply unanswerable: the retort would have been obvious, "Why do you command payment to support a rule based on coercion, if you hold all coercion to be wrong?" Nor do the evangelists seem conscious of any discrepancy between his support of Caesar and his general teaching.

The reference that Jesus here makes to the Jews' use of Roman coinage does not so much give his own judgment on the matter as show that his questioners had already given theirs; by accepting the benefits of Roman rule they had undertaken the obligation of supporting it. His own judgment is rather found in the words, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," which, since Jesus regarded all things as belonging to God, tell us that he regarded the payment of tribute to Caesar as part of the larger duty of giving to God the things that are God's, that is, he regarded the Roman rule as part of man's service to God. His answer may therefore be paraphrased into the assertion that the true Jewish patriotism lay not in the attempt to be free from Rome, but in the dedication of all their powers (including the facilities of Roman rule) to God's purpose.

Had Jesus declared that it was wrong to give tribute to Caesar, his decision would have lent support to the Jewish element that advocated armed rebellion, which illustrates what we shall see to be a fact, that where the corporate use of force in the interests of order is concerned, failure to support its use for order is tantamount to encouraging its use for disorder.

Jesus' decision that tribute ought to be paid to Caesar as Caesar's right carried with it his acceptance of the Roman rule and his rejection of the popular notion of a warrior Messiah, and the same rejection is enigmatically expressed in his correction of the scribe's description of the Messiah as the Son of David (Mark xii. 35-37). And the reason Jesus gave for the payment of tribute throws additional light on the question, Why, if Jesus did not condemn all coercion, did he refuse the common idea of a coercive Messiah? For it suggests that to give to Caesar the things that are Caesar's is but a small part of giving to God the things that are God's, and that the former is an unholy proceeding without the latter. Although the use of coercion may be necessary to organized society, its powers for good are limited and it is without the highest sanction unless with it much more than coercion is given in the service of God. Jesus seemed satisfied, and one cannot question the soundness of the judgment, that such service of society as necessitated the use of coercion was adequately rendered by Rome. Under the Roman Empire such order as was needful for human development was secured throughout the known world as it had never been before in the world's history. No other power had ever

rendered this service so adequately. "Render unto God the things that are God's" upon the lips of Jesus must be understood to call for the things that fulfil God's purpose and are subservient to his kingdom. And the inclusion of the things of Caesar in this category indicates that Jesus, far from regarding the Roman rule as belonging essentially to the devil, looked upon it as contributing to the kingdom of God. But the point of his answer was that the Jews' tribute to Caesar was sanctified because their service was to be greater than Caesar's,—they had things to render to God in the service of his kingdom beyond the scope of Caesar. Jesus undoubtedly accepted the prophetic destiny of his people as the light-bringer of the Gentiles, and he could not have failed to see in the security and order of the Roman world a most important factor for the fulfilment of that prophecy. Rome's efficient use of coercion in the interests of order made possible to Israel a greater service to humanity and God, but one in which coercion was worse than useless, and to that destiny Jesus would call and lead his people.

As we pass to consider Jesus as the fulfiller of the law, we shall find that his view of his relationship to the social and political development of his people harmonizes with this estimate of his relationship to the social and political development of the world. For just as this element of Israel's development, despite all its shortcomings, was an essential part of the whole historical movement that prepared the way for, and culminated in, Jesus' gospel of the kingdom, so, since that gospel is to be for the Gentiles also, their social

and political development must be regarded as an element in the history that prepared the world for it.

(3)

In Matt. v. 17, 18 we read that Jesus said, "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets : I came not to destroy but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished." (For verse 18 cf. Luke xvi. 17.) These words tell us that despite all appearance to the contrary Jesus regarded his own work not as a contrast to the law or an overriding of it but as its fulfilment. Verse 17 tells us that he held the law incomplete without his work : verse 18 tells us that to him the law was an essential part of the eternal purpose in which heaven and earth were incidents, and therefore that his own work was impossible without it.

And yet the law of which Jesus thus spoke, though it had other elements, was in origin and essence a penal code. Like other early codes it bore the marks of a time that had not come to distinguish between civil law, morals and religion : it was a penal code, a moral ideal and a faith, all in one : each of these three elements was essential, and to attempt to eliminate any one of them is to ignore history. For it is impossible to doubt that the law as a penal code, expressing the moral consciousness of the community, was an essential factor in the social and moral development of Israel which found its culmination in the teaching and work of Jesus. We need, for instance,

to remember that over the long period during which religion was a corporate rather than an individual concern, the penal system was the most marked form of corporate moral activity, so that the development of the law as a penal code played an important part in bringing into being the ethical theism which characterized the highest form of Hebrew religion. Those who regard all coercion as incompatible with love or destructive of love's ends, need to bear in mind that the law whose dominant intent Jesus defined as love to God and man (Mark xii. 28-31) was essentially, if only partially, a penal code.

In Matt. v. 21, 22 we have Jesus' criticism of an item of the law as a penal code: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment: but I say unto you, that every one who is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire." And his comment amounts to a tacit and general approval of the system, his criticism being that it does not go far enough. If we take the saying as it stands, then he expressly says that "the council," which was a punitive body, ought to deal with the man who says Raca to his brother, and so gives direct sanction to a penal court. If, as is possible, we should understand him in this clause to be again quoting old practice (see A. H. McNeile, *Matthew*, p. 62), he quotes it again with approval, only adding a severer judgment of his own. Had it been part of Jesus' teaching

to condemn all coercion, he could hardly, in comparing his teaching with the old law, have thus specifically criticized its penal enactments without expressing his disapproval of the system itself. It may perhaps be said that we have this explicit condemnation in Matt. v. 38-41, but we have seen the limits implied there, and we note that though in v. 40 Jesus speaks of the law court, his words are to the private person who may be brought before the judge,—that is, in his defining examples of non-resistance Jesus has both the judge and the private person in mind, but directs his injunction only to the private person.

We must not, of course, understand the general approval which Jesus here gives to the penal code to carry his consent to all its penalties. That it did not do so we should expect from his general attitude towards the law, and we have in John viii. 1-11 his implied condemnation of the penalty of stoning for adultery.

But for a fuller understanding of Jesus' relationship to the law we must ask more exactly what he meant by saying that he came to fulfil it, since he certainly did not mean an unquestioning obedience to all the details of the Mosaic law. We have therefore to ask what is involved in the fulfilling or true development of such an institution as the law was. And we see that in all human concerns desirable development comes when men, by relying on and using as a base what earlier methods have gained, proceed to higher methods and achievements. If Jesus' fulfilling of the law was of this sort—and there seems to be no alternative—it explains how he could approve the use of coercion as a necessary element in government and

law, but just because all that coercion could do was already tolerably done, he could fulfil the law by concentrating upon that which no coercion could achieve.

To say this is only to say that Jesus recognized, what seems to be the truth, that all social development involves specialization. We see it everywhere in human history. Effective manufacture needs division of labour. Not until men can be spared, or can spare part of their time, from the struggle for food and safety and order and so be relieved from activities otherwise necessary, do we find art and literature developing. Moral and religious advance is also by specialization: the higher stages of development in these do not come without the thinker and teacher, the seer and prophet, who in view of their office are relieved from duty of material production imposed upon others. Limitation and specialization of this sort is part of all practical intent and is a condition of all effective life. It was so with Jesus. His answer to Pilate (John xviii. 37), "To this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth," whether authentic or not, adequately describes his intent, and it is clearly a specialization. To bear witness to the truth is not the whole good of life, but in certain conditions it becomes the supreme need of the world.

But because we have to speak of Jesus' work as in some sense a specialization we must not think that this involves limitation of outlook. It may mean precisely the reverse: a comprehensive view of the whole of any practical situation will indicate the need for concentrating upon certain points. As

a matter of fact, for creative activity in the larger human concerns we cannot have effective specialization in act apart from great comprehensiveness of view.

And it is obvious that Jesus accepted the rôle of Messiah as a specialization. It was not a work that he could carry on in addition to the occupation which had hitherto held him ; it could find no place for the ordinary duties and relationships of life ; handicraft and home are both abandoned and Jesus devotes himself to a life which, because it was materially unproductive, was one in which it was impossible that he could have wished all men to follow him ; so that when it is observed that Jesus did not do this or that, it must not therefore immediately be argued that he thought it wrong to do these things, for the law of concentration and limitation must be taken into account.

Now it is quite clear that whatever warrant a man may see in the use of coercion for the purposes of order or protection of life and property, yet, if he dedicates his life to witnessing to the truth, he will find no use for compulsion in that endeavour. Men cannot be coerced into the understanding or acceptance of truth. So that just so far as the herald of truth sees that the things which coercion can secure are secured, he will abandon all use of it ; and, as we have seen, these things were in Jesus' time secured by the Roman rule more efficiently than ever before. Jesus could thus recognize the necessity and approve the efficiency of a method which was useless for the ends to which, because of this very efficiency, he could wholly devote himself.

The relationship of coercion to the ends of truth

may be seen in the case of almost any teaching. Compulsion cannot assist directly to the understanding and reception of truth, but it may easily be required to provide a condition of things needful for these ends. A school teacher cannot compel understanding, but may have to compel sufficient order to allow understanding. And it is noteworthy how close an analogy we have here to the one recorded coercive act of Jesus—the cleansing of the Temple—which was the forcible suppression of those activities that impeded worship and instruction in a place devoted to such purposes.

A somewhat analogous relationship seems always to be found between the higher appeals and the lower necessities of life. You cannot win a man to the highest by threatening to deprive him of life's necessities, nor bribe him to the highest by promising to provide them. But if his necessities are not provided for, your appeal to the higher will generally be vain, so that, if his bodily needs are not met, you must meet them before his soul will listen, and in this case you are likely to get either a pauperized assent to your truth or a prejudice towards its rejection arising from a natural, if misguided, sense of independence of spirit. Hence, if you are interested in propagating truth, it is best, when possible, to leave the provision of necessities in other hands. So that, however necessary the use of coercion by civil government may be, and however clearly Jesus may have seen this necessity, there is all the more reason why, for the purposes of his work, he stood aloof from it.

And the specialization visible in the life of Jesus after the beginning of his public work is seen in

the life to which he called the Twelve. He took them from materially productive labour to live, in part at least, on the gifts of others. They had a common purse ; but imitation of this method of finance does not seem to have been demanded from followers other than the Twelve (cf. Luke viii. 1-3 and Mark xv. 40, 41).

This principle of specialization occasionally comes to expression in the sayings of Jesus about himself or his followers. His reply to the man who wanted his decision on a question of inheritance, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you ?" (Luke xii. 14) seems to recognize the place and office of a law, from the activities of which he stands aside. In reply to the man who said, "Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father," Jesus said, "Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead" (Matt. viii. 22), or, as in Luke (ix. 60), "Leave the dead to bury their own dead ; but go thou and publish abroad the kingdom of God." The man should probably be understood as asking to remain at home until his father died rather than to attend the funeral of one already dead. But, whatever the service he proposes to render his father, Jesus tells him that it can and will be performed by those who either cannot or will not give God and the world the higher service that the man can give and that therefore he is to leave it to them. The form of Jesus' reply implies that his command would have been different if there had been no "dead" to bury the dead.

Amongst the special conditions which Jesus imposed upon the Twelve was one that varied according to circumstance. Ordinarily they seem

to have had a common purse, but this seems to have been a matter of convenience rather than principle, for the method is one that would very naturally be adopted by men living and acting together as they did. The statement of Acts iv. 32 that in the early Church "not one said that aught of the things which he possessed was his own, but they had all things in common" is sometimes connected with the common purse of Jesus and the Twelve and taken as indicating the moral teaching of Jesus on the matter of private property. But the author of this passage does not seem to have intended his words to have been taken very strictly, for if Barnabas in selling his land and handing the proceeds to the apostles only did what everyone was doing, why should his deed be specially recorded (Acts iv. 36, 37); and if community of property was understood to be a moral obligation, why did Peter say to Ananias of the proceeds of his property, "Whiles it remained, did it not remain thine own?" In a similar way we have to read Peter's assertion, "Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee" (Mark x. 28), in the light of the tradition embodied in John xxi. that the fishermen amongst the Twelve were able to resume their boats.

But when Jesus sent the Twelve out to preach the special condition was imposed that they were to go without any money and to rely entirely upon the hospitality of those to whom they were sent. This is not a condition dictated by their work as witnesses of the truth, for it is a better credential of such to go demanding nothing from their hearers. But the significance of the method is plain. To throw upon the people of Israel

the duty of providing for the preachers of the kingdom of God was to declare that it was about Israel's business that they went. Jesus could not but make the assumption that the things of the kingdom were Israel's special business: his countrymen were "the sons of the kingdom" (Matt. viii. 12): he wanted Israel to understand that it was about Israel's chief concern that the Twelve came. It will be noted that the command to go penniless was coupled with the command to confine themselves to Israel (Matt. x. 5, 6, 9).

This explanation is confirmed by Luke xxii. 35 ff. In answer to Jesus' question the disciples confess that on their penniless mission they lacked nothing. Jesus replies, "But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a wallet." The words show incidentally that the common purse was a matter of convenience and not of principle, but the chief interest is in the change of policy. Jesus gives the reason in verse 37: "For I say unto you, that this which is written must be fulfilled in me, and he was reckoned with transgressors: for that which concerneth me hath fulfilment." The words, "He was reckoned with transgressors," read in the light of the words that follow, express Jesus' recognition of his complete and final rejection by Israel. The great possibility and hope, warranted by the way the Twelve had been received, had darkened into a great national repudiation of all that was distinctive in Jesus' message of the kingdom. The assumption that the kingdom of God was Israel's chief business had been emphatically denied by Israel and therefore the method based on this assumption must be changed: the resumption of the purse by the

Twelve was equivalent to the shaking off the dust from their feet. Clearly, then, Jesus rescinds his instructions to the Twelve because Israel had finally rejected his teaching and leading with regard to the kingdom of God. It is necessary to understand this in order that we may also understand the latter part of Luke xxii. 36, which is in some respects the most important of Jesus' sayings upon the problem under examination.

In continuing the rescinding of his earlier instructions to the Twelve Jesus says, "And he that hath none, let him sell his cloke and buy a sword" (Luke xxii. 36). How are we to understand these words?

It has been contended that they are ironic. If so, it was irony the point of which was lost upon its hearers. That, of course, is possible, though not very likely, for irony has its distinctive tone, and that those who hear a speech, especially if they are intimate with the speaker, do not take it as ironic suggests that it was not so. And if that which is spoken ironically is taken otherwise, it becomes the speaker's duty to himself and to his hearers to correct the mistake, especially when uncorrected it would subvert his meaning upon an important matter. Now if he spoke these words in irony, Jesus knew that his disciples took them literally and was at no pains to correct their mistake. And the occasion was not one for irony, for which an honest speaker never seeks an occasion as Jesus sought this by his question. It is clear, too, that the saying about the sword has to be understood in the same way as the earlier half of the verse, and it is very hard to see how the disciples could take, or be expected to

take, as ironic the injunction no longer to go penniless upon their mission.

Many of these considerations also apply to the suggestion that the words are figurative. If so, Jesus refrains from correcting his disciples' mistake upon an important point. Nor can they be blamed for making the mistake, for if the sword is figurative the purse and wallet ought surely to be so also, but obviously are not. And we have the additional difficulty of finding any fit meaning for such a figure. To sell one's cloak and buy a sword could be figurative only of preferring spiritual aggression to comfort, but in this respect the spirit in which Jesus sent the Twelve on their penniless mission was certainly not intended by him to be radically altered in their work after his rejection ; so that the only natural meaning does not fit the context.

Everything goes to show that Jesus intended the word "sword" to be taken literally. This interpretation follows almost necessarily from the obviously literal sense of the words "purse" and "wallet" in the preceding sentence. The disciples take it literally and reply, "Lord, behold, here are two swords." And whatever Jesus' answer, "It is enough," may mean, it is not the correction of a misunderstanding and was not understood to be so by those to whom it was addressed. For immediately after (verse 49) we find the disciples actually armed and at the critical moment of his arrest asking Jesus whether they shall smite with the sword. And Jesus' reply, "Suffer ye thus far," does not imply that what he forbade on that particular occasion was on all occasions wrong, but rather implies the reverse. They are

not words natural to one who finds his followers doing what he had forbidden them to do in any circumstances, but rather of one who sets a particular limit to what is otherwise generally permissible. The very form of these words seems to bear special reference to the "But now . . ." of verse 36, as though the method there abrogated was just to be carried on "thus far."

In reading Luke xxii. 35-51 it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the evangelist understood that although Jesus would not allow his followers to use their arms to prevent his arrest, yet nevertheless they carried them at his instruction or at least with his knowledge and without his disapproval. The earlier part of this passage is peculiar to Luke, and it may be said that even if such a conclusion is justified it reflects only the opinion of the evangelist. But there is no observable tendency in Luke which would account for the introduction of such a saying as that of xxii. 36 on any other ground than that he found it in a source which he considered to be reliable. In fact, the general attitude of the gospel towards money makes us all the more sure that the evangelist found the command to resume the purse in an authority which he could not ignore or doubt.

The impression that this passage in Luke makes upon us is confirmed by the other three gospels, for although they all have accounts of the use of the sword at the arrest of Jesus, in none of them does Jesus rebuke the user for carrying it. In Mark Jesus says nothing. In Matthew and John Jesus tells the user to sheathe the sword, but does not rebuke him for carrying it nor bid him

abandon it. The reason given in Matthew is not the wrongness of its use but the danger of taking the initiative in its use ; for this must be the meaning of "they that take the sword"—otherwise, if the words are true without this implied limitation, he who kills the killer must himself be killed until all are killed but the last man, who becomes the one exception to the universality of the proverb's truth. In John the reason is, "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" Jesus forbids the use of the sword on this occasion not because it is in itself a wrong method of attempting anything, but because it is used in the attempt to prevent that which must not be prevented. In no case is any inkling given that the use of the sword is in all circumstances against his fundamental and known principles ; and in Matthew and John the command to sheathe the sword instead of to abandon it confirms the command recorded in Luke to go weaponed.

Thus it seems beyond doubt that the arms borne by the disciples at the time of Jesus' arrest were borne with his knowledge and consent. And since he would not allow their use in the prevention of his arrest, the question arises, With what intention did he permit them to be carried? It has been suggested that it was in order to avoid assassination, since, although he had made up his mind to die, he intended to compel the authorities to open proceedings, a purpose that lay behind his nightly exit from the city. It might possibly have been for the disciples' own protection : the guard would gladly have captured them (Mark xiv. 51, 52), but Jesus was anxious for their escape

(John xviii. 8), for the continuation of his work was at stake in their survival, and the words recorded in Matt. xxvi. 52, "Put up again thy sword into its place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," imply that so far as the sword was concerned his main thought was for his disciples' safety.

But it is clear enough that when Jesus said, "He that hath none, let him sell his cloke and buy a sword," he did not have the necessities of the immediate future in mind, for when the disciples replied that there were two amongst twelve he said, "It is enough," which words, although they must probably be understood merely as a dismissal of the subject and not as assenting that there were sufficient swords, yet make it quite clear that his earlier words on the pressing necessity of possessing a sword were not intended to apply to the immediate situation; and it is probably best to understand that in this matter and on this occasion Jesus simply left it to his disciples to do as they thought fit.

But we have still to ask, To what condition of things did Jesus refer in the words under discussion? We have seen that they occur as part of an injunction of a change of method given by Jesus to his disciples as the result of Israel's rejection of him and his message of the kingdom of God. And we have seen the meaning of the saying about the purse and wallet. But the saying about the sword is different, in this respect: that whereas the going without money concerned only the special mission work for the proclamation of the kingdom, the abstinence from coercion had hitherto marked the whole of Jesus' work, being

involved, as we have seen, in the very business of witnessing to the truth. Now the sword, in any literal sense in which Jesus could have countenanced its use, can only represent (as in Rom. xiii. 4) the use of coercion in resistance of evil. We must therefore understand that Jesus intended to rescind in this particular the method which he had hitherto followed and imposed upon his followers. But we must not understand this as involving a cancellation of Matt. v. 38-41, for, as we shall see, within the limits prescribed by the examples there given, the method enjoined is in all circumstances more effective than forcible resistance of evil. It must rather refer to all that aloofness from civil government and its methods which marks Jesus' work. It seems that Jesus abstained from all participation in the coercion exercised by government not because he counted it evil but because he saw that the good so obtained was secure enough without his assistance, and he was therefore free for a higher attempt, which coercion could not serve. Order was secure, and therefore Jesus could devote himself to truth, for whose ends the coercion needful for order was not only needless but harmful. But if Jesus' work stood in this relationship to civil government, the dependence was reciprocal. The right use of coercion makes possible something higher than coercion itself can attain; but that something higher is needful if the use of coercion is to continue to be just and effective in the maintenance of order. So that the world's refusal of the higher thing that Jesus brought must ultimately lead to the break-up of the order which made his work possible. Jesus foresaw that

Israel's rejection of him would involve his people in a ruinous war with Rome (Mark xiii. 2, Luke xix. 41-44, xiii. 5) and the world in a still wider ruin (Luke xvii. 26-30, Mark xiii. 8, 24, 25) which probably included, if it did not consist of, the break-up of the Roman order. And history confirmed the forecast. The Jews, in refusing the leading of Jesus, refused the only way in which their intense patriotism could develop without ruin to themselves and with blessing to the world ; and it is not stretching probabilities to say that had the Jews as a whole accepted the teaching of Jesus the power of the early Church would have been so multiplied that the Roman Empire would have been inspired with a new life in sufficient measure to outstrip the solvent and disruptive forces that broke it up. As it was, the world-order collapsed and the development of mankind suffered centuries of retrogression from which it is only now beginning to recover. The world reverted to political conditions analogous to those obtaining before the Roman Empire, i.e., before that level of the development of mankind had been reached at which Jesus found it possible to do his work. Jesus apparently foresaw that, as a result of his rejection, conditions would return to the world in which order would be so imperilled that those who sought the world's highest good would not be justified in leaving the maintenance of order to others, and in which the world's most urgent need would be strong and good government. He foresaw the reversion of the world to conditions in which the aloofness from governmental activities and methods which he had maintained would be harmful and wrong, and hence

his rescinding of instructions to the disciples and his command, "But now . . . he that hath none, let him sell his cloke and buy a sword." And one cannot help thinking that the dark ages would have been less dark and the dawn would have come sooner and more brightly if the followers of Jesus had understood this command, and instead of secluding themselves for the saving of their souls had grappled with the outstanding need of their age and taken their part in bringing order out of chaos.

Jesus' command to his followers in Luke xxii. 36 is thus a rescinding of that pacifism which is natural to those who devote themselves to the witness of truth. The rightness of such specialization as well as its possibility depends upon the existence of a certain amount of order. But the persistence of order depends upon the right use of power, which in its turn depends in the long run upon the acceptance of truth. So that when the world, having reached a stage in which such specialization for the truth was possible, rejected the truth so brought, there was inevitably a return to conditions in which this complete specialization was no longer possible or desirable.

And it is upon these lines that we can best understand why, in spite of his saying about the sword, Jesus would not allow its use in his defence. It is necessary to examine this because the pacifist maintains that Jesus' surrender of himself to suffering and death is the supreme instance of non-resistance, and that the vital importance of his death for Christianity makes the principle on which he acted central and universally applicable and obligatory, which assumption would preclude any

such interpretation as we have come to either as regards the saying about the sword or the limits of non-resistance.

We have in the first place to note that Jesus' whole action at the last Passover seems shaped by the intention of compelling the authorities to take action against him: his cleansing of the Temple compelled them to decide and to act. This is the very opposite of Matt. v. 38-41, where we are told to assist the evil-doer to more of what he is trying to get. Apart altogether from the violence involved in the eviction of the Temple-traders, when we read, "If any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also," we see that Jesus did not act on this saying in terminating the illegal traffic in the Temple court. And we have seen how in the story of the last days Jesus made use of the priestly fear of popular violence. In all this Jesus was evidently acting upon the limits of non-resistance which the examples of Matt. v. 38-41 suggest, for more was here at stake than any personal concern.

And further, if we interpret Jesus' acceptance of suffering and death as being determined by the principle of non-resistance to evil-doers, it follows that his action was primarily for the sake of those who were most active in opposing and killing him. But if so, his words to his disciples, "Take ye: this is my body" or "This is my body which is for you" or "is given for you," give no inkling of the most important aspect of his death and leave them with a quite inadequate and misleading interpretation of it. And we have also to mark that if the manner of Jesus' surrender

was primarily an endeavour to overcome the evil in those who were responsible for his death, it had very little effect, for so far as we know not one of those who were directly active in killing him was changed by his non-resistance.

The manner in which Jesus met his death is more simply explained in the light of his accepted task as witness of the truth. For it is evident that when truth brings upon a man the opposition of others, he serves truth best by suffering, since to strike always leaves the world in doubt whether he does not count safety above truth.

It may be as well to note here that the fact that Jesus chose to suffer rather than forcibly to resist the religious authorities of Jerusalem has never been a determining factor in Christendom's understanding of his death. It is true that all Christian thought of salvation has centred round his sufferings, but in this connection they have either been considered out of all relation to their historic setting as somehow caused by the demands of divine justice, or, where attempts have been made to relate theory to history, the power of his death has been found chiefly and finally in the spiritual suffering caused by the whole world's sin as culminating in its rejection of the salvation he brought and not in the physical suffering incurred by his surrender to the priests.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER STAGES

IN the last chapter we considered amongst other things what Jesus meant by saying that he came to fulfil the law. We saw that this saying registered his recognition of the law as a necessary preliminary and base of his own work in spite of the fact that the law was essentially a penal code, and, we may add, in spite of its provision for the exigencies of war. But we dealt with this relationship between the lower stages of human development and Jesus' work only from the point of view of his recorded sayings and practice. It is necessary now to consider the matter more generally as an aspect of racial development, and we shall find that history confirms the view that the teaching of Jesus is in vital and necessary relationship to the law as representing the use of coercion for social ends.

Words like, "Resist not him that is evil," or, "Why judge ye not of yourselves what is right?" impute to their hearers a sense of difference between right and wrong and would be meaningless to those in whom this sense had not been developed. But if we let our minds go back far enough we reach a stage in human (or, if we like to call it so, pre-human) development when right was an unknown quality and might or cunning was

the final determinant of all differences, when there was no law but jungle law. And we see that between this lower stage and the stage at which Jesus' words became intelligible another stage must have intervened. The moral teaching of Jesus thus depends upon the existence of a prior stage of moral development in the race.

Now it is a fact of human history that everywhere the moral advance of peoples from the most primitive, pre-moral state to a higher level has been through the institution of civil government in one or other of its many forms, all of which involve penal law and the possibility of war. Nowhere in the world has mankind advanced beyond the lowest levels of morality except through this development of non-voluntary communities extending over definite and mutually exclusive areas, and both exercising legal coercion within these limits and maintaining by arms their jurisdiction within this area against intrusion from without. So universal is this condition of moral development that the onus of proof lies with those who deny that it is necessary.

But there are certain other facts of moral evolution that show the causal connection in detail. It is a commonplace of moral history that before the stage at which men recognize a genuinely moral distinction between right and wrong there was one in which all human conduct, whether involving what we should call morals or not, was equally governed by unquestioned custom. The specifically moral distinction arose by a development through which the infringement of certain customs came to be looked upon as serious in a way that did not obtain with others. And there can be little

doubt that the most important step in this process was when the community began to penalize the infringement of certain customs. This relation of early penal law to morality appears in the practical identity of law and morality at a certain stage of human development.

It is clear that the peoples that were capable of developing moral distinctions gained an enormous advantage over those who failed or were slow to do so, and thus the survival and permanence of the gain was secured. And it also becomes clear that in its beginning the moral distinction was to some extent at least consciously connected with the good of the community. The particular issue before us illustrates this very strikingly. So far as the use of force is concerned, the earliest codes of law seem to have been little more than a limitation of revenge. It is probable that "an eye for an eye" was in the first instance a limit imposed by the community to secure itself against the passionate competition of private violence. The next step would be that the community did not merely prescribe the vengeance but undertook to effect it, so that the sure infliction of the penalty in every case might suppress private violence and obviate its disastrously anti-social effects. In this respect the development of government with coercive powers is the corporate reaction against the disintegrating results of private attempts at coercion: it monopolizes in order to minimize. So that in this case at least, in so far as corporate coercion was an element in the development of the moral distinctions, we see how closely those distinctions were connected with the common good. Here, too, we probably have the root of the retributive element

in penal justice, which we thus see to have been in origin an activity in which the community not only avenged the injured individual but at the same time marked the deed it punished as a wrong against itself.

But whatever be the precise nature of the various steps involved there can be no doubt that in the racial development of a sense of right and wrong an essential part was played by the institution of penal codes which are the corporate reaction of a community against anti-social activities. And however we interpret the words, "Resist not him that is evil," they would be quite unmeaning before the distinction between moral good and evil had been developed in the community. And since the stage at which they assume meaning is reached only through a process involving the corporate coercion of anti-social acts, those who understand Jesus as condemning all coercion make him condemn that without which his own words would have been meaningless and his work impossible.

Another connection may be observed between the corporate use of coercion and the moral development of the race. Not only is the early penal law a direct factor in the beginnings of moral consciousness in the race, but history seems to show that a certain degree of general security and order is a necessary condition of moral growth in a community, and that this has nowhere been attained except by governments exercising coercion. Wherever government ceases to be strong enough to secure order there is always retrogression in the moral level of the people. So universal is this sequence that again the onus of proof lies with those who question its casual nature.

The highest levels of moral and spiritual development demand more than a minimum of order and security. They seem to need some development of general civilization. At least it is a fact of history that the highest moral teaching does not appear until a certain level of civilization is reached. And nowhere in the history of the world has that level been reached apart from the development of governments using coercion.

A particular aspect of this relationship demands special attention. One of the most important steps in the race's development was from the nomad to the settled state. The highest moral and religious teaching does not appear until the beginnings of settled life have been made good. If the life of Israel had never become settled enough to produce and conserve a literature, it is hardly open to doubt that her religion and morals would have stopped far short of that unique development that found its culmination in the teaching of Jesus. But the momentous step from nomad to settled life involves something more than governmental coercion of lawless individuals: it brings the necessity of armed defence. For in the early stages of civilization, settled peoples were always a temptation to those who were still nomads and who, recognizing no obligation and despising the softer life of the settled, took every opportunity of raiding them. So that one of the most marked features of the history of civilization has been the struggle between the nomads and the settled peoples, who could save themselves and their civilization from destruction only by organizing armed resistance. An appeal to the conscience of the nomads was impossible, for they generally looked upon more

settled life as degenerate and their raids as the vindication of the true way of living. We can imagine the result of a Canaanite appealing to the conscience of Joshua on this point. We see thus that the conditions necessary for moral development demanded corporate armed resistance to external elements of disorder.

There is another point of connection between the moral development of the race and war. We have seen the part played by penal law in moral development and by governmental coercion in securing a morally necessary order. But it is a significant fact of earlier human history that the desire for security and order were never by themselves able to create an authority strong enough to secure them. It has only been by governments endowed with rights and sanctions other than those which would seem logically to belong to custodians of order that order has been achieved. These apparently mundane benefits have never been obtained except from governments that have been accorded some sort of divine right, which at the earlier stages is explicit and seems to persist in a less obvious form even into modern times. It has been said that a state is no more sacred than a parish council, but the statement, however true in the abstract—in which nothing is more sacred than anything else—ignores the historical and psychological fact that, where the state is not held more sacred than the parish council, both are found functioning badly. In the earlier stages man always traces his laws to divine origin, and the head of the government is always a sacred person. It would be difficult to instance any effective government in any but modern times in which

those who governed were not regarded as having a sacred right to that office. It would thus seem that an essential element in all government, if it was to be effective to keep peace within, was that those in whom it was vested had a sacred right and duty in their place, which belonged to them alone and which must not be surrendered to violence either from within or from without. Hence a concomitant of any effective government was the conviction that any attempt of a foreign power to supersede or control or entrench upon it must by all means be resisted, and that this defence of its integrity was a sacred duty and the greatest service to the common weal.

The recognition of this connection gives to us moderns the sociological justification for what seems to be the absurd enthusiasms of peoples of an earlier time for the dynastic rights and successions of their sovereigns. When kings ruled, the belief that they had a most sacred right to their position was necessary if their authority was to be effective for peace and order within their realms, and this carried with it the conviction that the governed ought to defend them against any threat or insult from without. Carlyle's description (*Sartor Resartus*, Book II, chap. viii) of the thirty villagers from the British Dumdrudge meeting thirty from the French Dumdrudge on the fields of Spain and blowing the souls out of each other without having the smallest quarrel between them leaves out of count the salient fact that these villagers were moved by a sentiment of loyalty essential to the existence of what was essential to their own existence—an effective government.

As constitutional and democratic institutions

replace monarchical autocracy the sacred rights of kingship are replaced in popular conviction by the sacredness of liberty, and the sentiment and enthusiasm for dynastic rights are transformed into a sentiment and enthusiasm for national institutions and political independence. And this sentiment and enthusiasm seem to be necessary if the government of a people is to be permanently effective and helpful to moral development. For the limitation of individual freedom necessary for order is most efficient and morally helpful when it comes from an authority revered and loved ; so that patriotism seems to be a necessary stage in the race's moral development. In cases where one state takes over the government of another, and a government, however efficient, is imposed upon an unwilling people, the result is generally morally detrimental, though, of course, cases might be imagined or instanced in which such action prevented worse evils or brought into play counteracting influences. There would seem to be a certain stage in the development of peoples, a stage somewhat above the lowest and somewhat below the very highest, in which political independence is essential to healthy moral development.

In this connection we need to remember that over a long period of human growth government and the service of government are avenues for the highest moral activity, for they become the way to much other public service besides the securing of safety and order. They come to represent the widest human interest in which man can be practically effective. The only other altruistic interest of equal power and importance is that of parenthood, in comparison with which it must be

remembered that in patriotism the instinctive has undergone more idealization and intellectualization and is further on the road to becoming a conscious and rational self-dedication to ends greater than self. The parental instinct is more simply instinctive and is confined to a few very concrete objects, and can hardly become idealized and intellectualized without developing into a broader altruism with outlook wider than the family.

The spiritual importance of patriotism may be seen in the history of religion, a marked stage of which, mediating between primitive forms and the rise of the universal religions, is that in which religion is supremely a national concern and is in closer alliance with patriotism than with any other human interest.

Hence at a certain stage the preservation of political independence was a necessary condition for the development of the higher reaches of moral and religious life, and under these conditions war was sometimes corporate action for ideal ends or for the defence of ideal interests, and gave occasion for the most complete subordination and sacrifice of the individual for the common good and of the physical for the ideal. This stage might be illustrated by the Greek struggle against Persia or the Maccabaean revolt against Antiochus Epiphanes, in both of which we can recognize the consciousness of an ideal at stake.

It may be safely said that the work of Jesus would have been impossible without the religious and moral development of Israel, which was itself bound up with the national life and dependent upon political continuity, a continuity which at certain points was undoubtedly due to armed

defence. The beginning of Israel's national life and self-consciousness was union against a common foe. It is true that Israel's religion survived the Babylonian captivity, but the height of the growth that enabled it to do so could not have been attained without preceding political independence ; and it would seem that Isaiah's confidence as to the inviolability of Zion marks the period in Jewish history when political independence was necessary for moral and religious growth. We need also to remember that Babylon made no attempt to suppress Israel's religion, so that the chief concern of their national life was preserved to them, while their national self-consciousness was supported in the conditions of political subjugation by the patent superiority of their religion and morals over those of their conquerors ; and it is to be noted that the survival of Judaism was due to those who went into captivity, and to whom therefore the comparison was obvious, and not to those who were left in Palestine robbed of their political independence and feeling only the superior force of their masters. When, later, Antiochus Epiphanes tried to suppress their religion by force the Jews felt that the real concern of their nation was at stake, and the passion of their revolt more than equalized the odds of science and discipline. And it is probable that without the Maccabaean revolt the rest of Israel would have suffered the religious obliteration and absorption that overtook the ten tribes deported by Assyria.

It may be replied that it would have been better had the Maccabees been faithful in martyrdom, but this demands the solution of the problems of one stage by qualities not yet developed. At that

stage of religion such a method of defence was not possible and does not become so until religion is fully spiritualized. You cannot by martyrdom keep a holy place from desecration or maintain a daily sacrifice, and while these things are an essential part of religion, the question as to whether martyrdom is better than fighting for one's religion does not and cannot arise. The complete spiritualization of religion had not come into the world, and did not come until a later stage of the very development of which the Maccabaean revolt was an integral part. It is extremely improbable that at the Maccabaean stage of its development the religion of Israel would have long survived the suppression of all public expression of it.

But the part that patriotism played in securing the continued development of Israel's religious life is not the only point at which it touches the work of Jesus. As the highest development of altruistic instinct patriotism itself was the main element in the higher reaches of moral structure immediately below the highest. And patriotism itself needed developments on two points:—

(1) The desire to serve the nation must be enlarged into the desire to serve the world, otherwise a nation's patriotism is likely to become a danger both to itself and the world;

(2) The instinctive in patriotism must be replaced by a conscious and rational self-devotion, otherwise it is at the mercy of an alliance between self-regarding interests and the critical intellect. The second point can be secured only by a spiritual interpretation of reality which finds the fundamental truth of the universe to be a Spirit of infinite goodwill, in fellowship and co-

operation with which man sees his own highest good must lie. Jesus brought to the religion of Israel its final consummation in the thought of God as Father, and so made it capable of giving to the world what would conserve its highest moral achievement by lifting it one step higher. It seems that he would have lifted the patriotism of his people to a point at which they should see that their true greatness lay in being able to render the world a service that no other nation could give: theirs it might be to be the light of the world. He would have flung the tremendous force of the Jewish national spirit into the world's service. The patriotism both of Israel and the world was to find its goal in the kingdom of God.

Thus from many points of view it is evident that the corporate use of coercion is an essential element in the moral advance of humanity, in which advance the teaching of Jesus represents the highest phase. And he himself recognized this relationship by speaking of himself as the fulfiller of the law.

And it must be remembered that in the moral progress of the world all men do not take the same step at the same time. All stages co-exist. So that the means by which the earlier steps were secured continue to be necessary despite the existence of individuals with whom other means are effective. In any case, even at present, of all the peoples of the world who are above the lowest level of development none exists without a government using coercive powers. And a comparison of the moral level of peoples where government is strong with those where it is weak indicates that the use of coercion by government is at present as essential to morality as it was in the past.

It is, of course, quite possible to find communities primitive enough to be without organized legislature, but enforcement is none the less present, and the organization of it as a corporate activity always appears as progress takes place. So, too, it is possible to find peoples without an army, but this is only when they can rely on the protection of stronger neighbours or are protected by natural barriers, and in the first case the loss of independence and in the second case the extraordinary isolation is generally accompanied by arrested development.

The recognition of the sequent and concomitant relationship of the various steps in the moral progress of the race confirms certain important results of our last chapter. Jesus could act as he did, not merely because Moses and the Maccabees were his predecessors but because Caesar was his contemporary. Because the order of the world could be safely left in Roman hands, Jesus and his followers could devote themselves entirely to the witness of the truth. And the political oneness of the world under the Roman Empire provided the opportunity and created the need for the sublimation of patriotism into an enthusiasm for humanity inspired by the fatherhood of God.

Even from the point of view of governmental efficiency, when the social order is sufficiently secure certain men may with great advantage be freed from participation in the work of coercion in order that they may give themselves to religious and moral teaching, for an efficient government depends in the long run upon the desire for the common good and the spirit of service amongst the people. And in default of these moral qual-

ties in the governed, all government ultimately loses efficiency and disintegrates, as did the Roman Empire ; for, through Israel's rejection of Jesus, his truth did not find a vehicle sufficient to bring it swiftly and forcibly enough to the world's need.

And when order is endangered, or when the political disintegration of the world is such that one central control is no longer possible and order can be secured only by independent governments working over comparatively small areas, so that political independence is at the same time a condition of moral growth and an object of attack by lawless or ambitious neighbours, then it is no longer possible for those who seek the highest to stand aside from the corporate use of coercion for the ends of order and independence.

The relationship of the work and teaching of Jesus to governmental coercion is thus threefold :—

(1) Corporate coercion played an essential part in the whole process of social and moral and religious development of which his work is the culmination ;

(2) It was a concomitant necessity to his work, but since it was adequately used by others, he was free to specialize upon his task of witnessing to the truth ;

(3) He foresaw the time when, owing to his rejection by the Jews, order would again be the world's most pressing problem, and when the specialization to which he had given himself and called his immediate followers would no longer be the way to the world's help. Hence, as we have seen, when that rejection became indubitable, he recalled the specialization imposed upon his followers (Luke xxii. 35-37).

CHAPTER IV

THE ETHICS OF RESISTANCE AND NON-RESISTANCE

WE have now to consider as a question of general ethics the point at issue between those who condemn all coercion and those who hold that under certain circumstances it is a necessary instrument of goodwill.

(1)

We have already noted that in Matt. v. 38-41 Jesus gives no motive or end for his commands, but we may assume that the aim of the method of action enjoined was to get the evil out of the evil-doer's heart. Supposing the method enjoined to be the most effective means to this end, can we discover *how* it works? It is necessary to ask this because the point at issue is one of method. All Christians are agreed that it is right to love our enemies, but the question is as to the deeds that are compatible with love and efficiently instrumental to its ends.

It is sometimes supposed that the method of action enjoined by Jesus was intended to move the conscience of the evil-doer by showing him a better spirit, i.e., that it is an effective way of administering a rebuke. But this would mean that

Jesus commanded us to say by act what he forbade us to say by word, "Let me cast out the mote out of thine eye." And an act that produced on the wrong-doer the impression that the wronged was trying to improve the occasion for his moral betterment would be most likely to have an opposite result.

Another suggestion is that this method of action is to show the evil-doer that his victim loves him. But a deed done principally to show love always has a fatal element of unreality: for the desire to show love has to express itself by a deed that renders some specific service, which service is its ostensible but not its real aim. The aim is not really to seek the other's good by such means as the opportunity allows but to let him know that we are seeking it. Such a ruse is pretty in the child and pardonable in the lover who desires above all things to be loved again, but it is too compromised with indirectness for the love that would overcome evil.

But again, if we ask whether the method involves the attempt to produce some specific good for the evil-doer, it is difficult to see that it does in the case of the command to turn the other cheek.

It is best, therefore, to proceed more inductively and ask what would be the actual results most likely to follow in the three instances given by Jesus (Matt. v. 39-41). And it appears that the most obvious result of them all would be to reduce aggressive injustice to absurdity. If we imagine with sufficient vividness a man turning the other cheek or offering his waistcoat, too, when his coat was demanded or treating an alien official like a beloved friend from whom he could not tear

himself, we shall see that the situation would resolve itself into a burst of laughter. And this, where possible, would surely be the most effective way; for the core of the evil deed is that it outrages the fellowship of man with man, while to laugh together is to restore fellowship. And the act regarded in this way shows no exhibition of superiority, no desire to rebuke, no artificial evidence of love, but is a straightforward attempt to put fellowship in the place of its opposite. But the method is costly and requires a wonderful freedom of spirit and a desire for human fellowship strong enough to outweigh the proper pride and material considerations involved.

If it should seem a western exaggeration to see the issue of Jesus' injunctions in laughter, we come to much the same conclusion when, putting results aside, we ask what is common to the action enjoined in the three instances which he gives. For their common feature is that the wronged co-operates with the wrong-doer and thus seeks the only sort of fellowship that the occasion allows. We should probably not be wrong in going further and seeing in them a reference to eastern ideals of hospitality. The injured man is told to treat the injurer as an ideal eastern host would treat his guest, even to the extent of indulging a malicious whim at the cost of personal dignity. The direct aim of the act is thus to exhibit a desire for, to invite to, and to attain, fellowship. And such a response, with its obvious cost and self-forgetfulness, must make a powerful appeal to the evil-doer. The act does not say, "I will show you your sin" or "my love" but "I want your fellowship and friendship."

Under the conditions obtaining in the instances which Jesus gives this method would undoubtedly be most effective, but it must be noted that its efficacy lies not so much in the absence of resistance, forcible or argumentative, as in the positive deed that seeks fellowship. This conclusion supports the results of our earlier examination of the passage (Matt. v. 38-41), to the effect that Jesus intended the method enjoined to apply only to cases where no third party was involved. For it is sometimes contended that although the instances given in Matt. v. 38-41 do not include a case in which the interests of a third party are involved, yet they can be given this extension by the application of the Golden Rule, on the argument that a man ought not to use for the defence of others means by which he himself does not want to be defended. But although, whether right or wrong, it would be at least possible to apply the Golden Rule in this way to the negative command "Resist not him that is evil," it would be altogether impossible to apply it at all to the positive injunctions which we see to form the more important part of the passage. How, for instance, apart altogether from any question of rightness or wrongness, is a man to apply the command to turn the other cheek or to go the second mile when it is someone else that has received the initial injury?

It is clear therefore that the endeavour to make non-resistance universally obligatory cannot claim to found itself upon Jesus' command in the Sermon on the Mount, for there non-resistance is inseparably connected with positive commands which cannot be extended to cases where a third party is concerned. It must therefore, if it can,

justify itself upon general grounds, which seemingly must be one of the two following:—

(1) That to coerce forcibly, to wound or kill, is in itself an ultimate evil, i.e., is an act not to be done for any consideration or under any circumstances. This again implies either the first or the second and third of the three following assumptions:—

(a) That there is no good greater than physical liberty, bodily wholeness, or life—which nobody thinks.

(b) That acts of coercion, wounding, killing, can never play a part in conserving or producing any moral good. It is sometimes argued that physical force cannot by its very nature produce moral results. In a sense this is true: you cannot by brute force compel a man to be good. But in a wider sense it is not true. We can generally effect no moral ends at all without the use of some physical force as a medium; but it is, of course, not the physical force itself that produces the moral result but the goodwill that employs the force. And to this general rule there is no reason for making an exception when the physical force used involves personal coercion or violence. The assumptions that love and goodwill never use coercion and that coercion never helps them to their ends are both abundantly contradicted by the facts of life, as every place can witness where children are well trained either by their parents or others. And something of the part that coercion plays in the development of moral good has been shown in the last chapter.

(c) That, whatever evil a man attempts, his attempt can never endanger anything that ought

to be of greater value to his fellows than his own physical well-being. Everyone agrees that a man may have to, and when the occasion demands ought to, sacrifice his own limb or life rather than higher values, but the pacifist seems condemned to the conclusion that a case can never arise where he has to choose between the liberty, wholeness or life of another and some higher value. His position implies that no action from which it is possible forcibly to restrain a man can ever endanger values greater than would be endangered by such an act of restraint, an assumption incompatible with any possible standard of moral values or any tolerable estimate of life's interrelatedness, and, as we shall see, with commonest experience.

(2) If the wrongness of coercion in itself cannot be proved, nor that it is altogether without power of conserving or mediating moral results, it may yet be contended that a purer and more efficient way of dealing with evil-doing is always possible—i.e., that of non-resistance—and therefore always obligatory upon all who know it. Now we have seen that, within the limits suggested by Matt. v. 38-41, a method involving non-resistance undoubtedly has very great advantage, but we have also seen that the positive part of this method cannot possibly be applied where a third party is concerned, and we have therefore to ask whether the negative command which in this passage seems only a preliminary to the positive can, when taken by itself, be rightly extended beyond the limits implied in the words of Jesus.

We may note first, in cases such as those that Jesus instances, where no third party is concerned, that if a man merely refrained from resisting and

did not go on to positive co-operation, then although the moral impact of his deed would lose greatly, the result so far as the evil-doer was concerned, might still be better than that of forcible resistance. It might make him think. No doubt, without the positive acts enjoined, the aggressor might, especially in certain conditions, ascribe non-resistance to cowardice, in which case its moral effect would be balked. But where the interests of no third party are concerned forcible resistance would doubtless appear to the aggressor to have purely self-regarding motives, and would tend to rouse in him stronger passions of the same sort, while non-resistance, when not likely to be mistaken for cowardice, would make him more uncomfortable in his aggression than he would otherwise have been unless his conscience was very hardened or undeveloped. It would seem therefore that, where no third party is concerned, non-resistance, even without the positive action enjoined by Jesus, is in certain conditions a more effective and better way than resistance for overcoming the evil in the evil-doer's heart.

We have now therefore to consider whether, thus taking non-resistance by itself, i.e., without the positive additions which are the most important part of Jesus' saying, we can apply the Golden Rule and reason, "I ought not to defend others by means by which I do not myself wish to be defended." And it would seem that this application is not warranted. The Golden Rule was given as the means to the discovery of what is right. It does not say, "As ye think right for men to do to you, do ye also to them likewise," which would be mere tautology, for to think a sort of action right is

to think it binding both on oneself and others. The proper material for the Golden Rule to work upon is desire that has not yet been ethically determined, "Whatsoever ye *would*," and if we apply it to what is already an ethical judgment we misapply it; for by so doing the authority of Jesus could be claimed for any idea of right. And this misapplication is made when a man says, I desire not to be defended by force and therefore I ought not so to defend others. For his desire depends upon an already made ethical judgment that the use of force is wrong. If he were to ask himself whether, apart from the conviction that the use of force was wrong, he would wish in case of extreme need to be defended by it, there is little doubt of the answer. And if to this ethically undetermined state of mind he applies the Golden Rule as an ethical determinant he will find that what he would naturally wish done for him in his own case becomes his duty in the case of another, and this undoubtedly indicates effective resistance.

And this indication is confirmed when we consider the effect of resistance and non-resistance where a third party is concerned. If I find the strong ill-treating the weak, what ought I to do? Those who uphold the universality of non-resistance would say, You must reason with the wrong-doer and, if necessary, must yourself take the blows, but must rather let the ill usage proceed than use violence upon the aggressor.

It is probable that where a man by reasoning or by interposing his body and receiving the blows could effectively secure the immunity of the intended victim, to do so would be the best way of dealing with the case and the

most effective way to make the wrong-doer think. But there are many cases in which, if effective protection is to be secured, there is no time to argue, or in which it is evident that if passive interposition fails it will then be too late for active resistance. It is also quite likely that resistance by word or by passive interposition will result in increasing the evil-doer's passion, for opposition of any sort often produces this effect. Supposing, then, a case where, words and passive interposition having failed or being inopportune, I let the evil-doer go on with his ill usage of the weak, what effect would that have on his mind as compared with an ultimate resort to active resistance? The failure of words and of passive interposition show that they have had no moral effect and have rather already resulted in an accession of evil passion, so that the addition of active resistance cannot be condemned on that score. Non-resistance would leave the aggressor with the impression that I was not really concerned with the protection of the weak but with something else. He would argue, "He would rather that I made the weak suffer, than that he should make me suffer," which is not likely to be a very effective moral challenge.

But the full effect of the action on the wrong-doer cannot be seen until we consider the victim. It is necessary to remember that whenever an act done to a person is morally wrong, it is so because it injures the moral life of the victim. It is impossible, of course, to make a person morally evil, but it is only too possible to do things that make it more difficult for him to do right and easier for him to do evil; and this it is that con-

stitutes the moral gravity of an evil act where a moral agent is the victim.

It may perhaps be suggested that murder disproves this statement, since it cannot be said that a murdered man finds it more difficult to be good. But do we know enough about the hereafter to be sure of this? Does it not assume a discontinuity between our moral life here and hereafter much greater than is compatible with the grounds on which we believe in a future life? And if we believe that man has a future life and that murder inflicts no moral disadvantage upon him, why should the murder of a man be worse than the taking from an ox of the only life it has? In any case it is certain that when the possibility of being murdered becomes appreciable it is morally detrimental, and that fact, without any reference to the hereafter at all, is sufficient to show that murder is no exception to the principle laid down.

The moral disadvantage that the evil deed imposes upon its victim has various elements. The prime matter of injury to property or person or liberty is a moral injury because these things are needful for the moral and spiritual development of personality. The injury also tends to rouse passions that become a temptation to evil, such as hate and deceit. It is a breach of the social compact and so produces a sense of insecurity with the temptation to fear and suspicion. A wrong inflicted makes faith in humanity more difficult, and is evidence of the absence, or rather of the opposite, of that positive ally of all that is good in a man—fellowship and love.

The proportion of these various elements in the total effect upon the victim will vary according to

his moral stature, according to which also will vary the strength of the temptation to which they give rise. But it must be remembered that although a man may overcome evil with good, the evil is still a moral injury to him. It is always better for any man's soul to be treated with fairness and love than with injustice and hate.

These considerations bring out the further very important fact that it may be morally a great gain to prevent an evil act even though you cannot change the evil will. If some tyrant wanted to impose slavery upon a population, it would be a great moral gain to prevent it and so to obviate conditions that handicap moral development, even though the tyrant's will remained unaltered. When there is a lawless element in a population it is a moral gain for the whole if a strong government can obviate the sense of insecurity, the fear, the suspicion, and the passion of reprisal that attend uncontrolled lawlessness, even though it does not succeed in changing the lawless will. It is a great gain to terminate social and industrial conditions detrimental to moral development, however unwilling those may be who have profited by them. Generally there is no doubt that an evil actually inflicted is more likely to cause hatred than one intended but thwarted, and the same is largely true of all the morally detrimental results of an evil deed. It would no doubt always be best if we could prevent the evil deed by converting the evil will, but it is also indubitable that there are many cases in which it is a moral gain to the world to prevent the deed when we cannot change the will.

Another consideration must be taken into account. In the common conscience of mankind

there is a very strong distinction between the just and unjust exercise of coercion, and when we think we are being made to suffer unjustly there is a very strong temptation to a morally harmful reaction, while the recognition that we have deserved what we suffer is morally helpful. Of course, there is generally a tendency to justify one's own position to oneself, but there are limits to success in this attempt, which has always to contend with an undercurrent of truth or sensitiveness to criticism or both.

This universal distinction between justly and unjustly inflicted suffering and the consequent difference in moral result means that when a man is in the position where he must either inflict justly deserved suffering or allow unjust suffering to be inflicted, he can have no hesitation as to which is right. If I desist from action necessary to secure this preference it would lead the evil-doer to the further conclusion that I saw no difference between just and unjust coercion: he could say to himself of my action, "He would rather that the innocent suffered wrongly at my hands than that the guilty should suffer rightly at his."

It here becomes clear that those who extend the principle of non-resistance to cases where a third party is concerned thereby deny that there is any difference between just and unjust coercion so far as their effect upon the moral life of the world is concerned. The pacifist sometimes endeavours to disguise the implications of his position by according a relative justification to those who use coercion for what they deem to be right ends. But this relative justification turns out to be, not the acknowledgment that a certain amount of good can

be done by coercion, but merely the assent that it is right for a man to do what he believes to be right ; that is to say, it does not allow that the enforcement of any law or the loftiest spirited use of arms contributes anything more to the good of humanity than head-hunting or religious prostitution, but allows the same relative justification to participants in all these on the ground that you must not condemn a man for doing what he holds to be right.

We find thus that the endeavour to make non-resistance obligatory under all circumstances on the ground that, although coercion may do some good, there is always a better way, does, when practically applied, resolve itself into the assumption that coercion can never under any circumstances produce or conserve any moral good. And this seems to be a logically necessary connection, for to allow that coercion may make some contribution to the moral good of the race but to deny that it ever ought to be allowed to do so is self-contradictory ethics. It may be answered, No, it is no more self-contradictory than to say that we can do some good although we always ought to do better. But this is true of the spirit, not of the means it uses: if, in the actual conditions of knowledge and material in which we work, we use means less efficient than we might, it is because our spirit is deficient. The assertion that there is always a better way thus really amounts to a condemnation not of coercion as a less efficient means but of the spirit of anyone who uses it. There are only two ways by which we arrive at a judgment as to the moral effect of any act : one is by observing the results, and the other is by the conviction that the

result is determined by the spirit or intent of the act. Now it is impossible to say from observation that coercion never contributes to the moral good of the race or that there is always an alternative way which bids fair to produce more good: in fact all experience and observation are against these conclusions. The conviction therefore that coercion never helps or that there is always a better way assumes, if it does not express, that there is something defective in the spirit of all who use coercion. There is thus an implicit assumption of moral superiority on the part of the pacifist. The argument is always found finally to retreat from the impossible endeavour to prove from fact that love never uses coercion or never uses it effectively to the assumption that the use of coercion indicates a lack of the right spirit and therefore cannot be expected to produce good results. But this last assumption, of course, begs the question, and relinquishes the attempt to pass judgment upon coercion as a means.

As soon as we contemplate a concrete case we see that the non-resistance, which in some cases at least is the best expression of love (or perhaps we should say, the negative condition of those acts that are its best expression), acquires by the introduction of a third party an opposite significance. For when a third party is being wronged, if neither words nor passive resistance can get the wrong-doer to desist, then love to him, so far as the particular emergency is concerned, is barred all expression; for it cannot go on to positive co-operation in obtaining more of what he seeks by his ill deed, as enjoined in Matt. v. 38-41, where there is no third party. Love can in this case act only by

an effective defence of the victim, and this is the only deed by which love to the wrong-doer can express itself helpfully, for the love he needs to know and the power of which he needs to feel is precisely the love that has others besides himself as its object. When therefore a third party is concerned a resistance of the evil as efficient as we can make it is often the only means by which love can express itself effectively both to the victim and to the wrong-doer.

The last consideration brings to light a principle often disregarded in the discussion of this problem. It is sometimes maintained that in dealing with the evil-doer the paramount consideration, to which all others must give way, is the desire to change his heart, and the regard for this consideration is proffered as the final test of right action when dealing with the evil-doer. But this statement of the case is apt to be misleading, for it suggests that, although a third party may be concerned, his interest cannot rank in importance with the need for converting the evil-doer, and therefore his presence can make no radical difference to the action for which the occasion calls.

The issue concerns a situation very common in life, where it is often found that moral ends seem best served by forgetting them, the reason being that the moral end proposed is too narrow and therefore tends to defeat itself. If, for instance, a man was engaged upon a piece of work, it might seem unexceptionable to say that the most important thing about the job was its effect upon his moral character. But if he worked consciously putting this intent first, it would not produce as good effects upon his character as if he put first

the endeavour to produce as good work as possible. The clue to this apparent anomaly lies in recognizing that bad work is a moral injury not only to the doer but to everyone who buys or uses or sees it, while good work is the opposite. So that if a man considers the effect that his work will have on his character rather than the excellence of the work itself, he is preferring his own moral development to that of mankind, a preference that must pervert any life that harbours it, or rather that indicates a blindness to the true nature of moral good.

In the same way, to deal wholesomely with the evil-doer we must recognize that the moral good of every other soul concerned in the transaction is equally important, and that any act which is not based upon and does not clearly express this equal importance of others will tend rather to fortify than diminish his self-preference and anti-social tendencies. The recognition of the interests of others (which simply means that you must not love unfairly) introduces a stern element into love which prevents it from dissolving into sentimentality.

A redemptive act is one that helps a man to overcome the evil in him. In the case of a man who injures another that evil is fundamentally lack of love and goodwill. What sort of action is best calculated to change that disposition? Clearly one that springs from love and goodwill and expresses these things most indubitably. We might also feel inclined to add, one in which the love or goodwill has the evil-doer as its object. This is true, but only in certain circumstances. A more important thing is to make him realize

that a true goodwill makes no favourites and is therefore the enemy of self-preference. Unless this is made unmistakably clear, love and goodwill may only contribute to condone and facilitate deeds of injustice, as often happens in cases of class and family and gang relationships. Now in the cases given by Jesus in Matt. v. 38-41, there being no third party involved, the impartiality of a true goodwill is most effectively expressed in the complete freedom from self-concern evinced by the acts commended to the victim. But where the interests of a third party are involved, no act can help the wrong-doer to a better state of mind that does not express simply and forcibly as great a goodwill for the injured as for the injurer. Non-resistance certainly does not do this, and it is done only by taking the most effective means to prevent the injury, and this therefore in these circumstances is the true method of redemptive love.

Before passing on to deal with legal coercion and war, it may be noted that, if resistance is right where a third party is concerned, it would seem to follow that a man has no right to surrender by non-resistance anything necessary to the fulfilment of his responsibilities to others. It is noticeable that although the Old Testament citation of Matt. v. 38 speaks of so serious an injury as the loss of an eye, the instances of non-resistance given in the verses following concern nothing that approaches this in seriousness, nothing in fact that would disable a man in the discharge of responsibilities to others. For if a man, rather than resist the evil-doer, allowed himself to be made unable to provide for those for whose provision he was re-

sponsible, and so consigned them to suffering and loss, his act would fail to express the impartiality essential to redemptive love. It may perhaps be rejoined that Jesus surrendered his own life, but it should be remembered that he had no responsibilities of a kind that could be so endangered except one for which we are told (John xix. 26, 27) he could and did make provision. We have seen also that the non-resistance of Jesus at his capture was probably motived by his vocation as witness of the truth; and non-resistance in this connection need not necessarily have the same limits as non-resistance of evil motive by the desire to reform the evil-doer. Of course, where a man is compelled to choose between recanting his convictions and suffering, the question does not arise. But it would seem that generally a man has no right to sacrifice the interests of others or his own power to fulfil his responsibilities to them by placing himself, either voluntarily or by refraining to escape or to resist, in a position where he is compelled to such a choice. Occasions however may arise where owing to the importance and need of the truth this limit may have to give way.

We should also note that although, when the interests of a third party are at stake non-resistance is generally wrong, yet an exception may occur if the third party himself does not wish to resist. If I know that he wishes to take the way of non-resistance, and if I judge that it is a case in which he is right in doing so, then I should be wrong to interfere. And this would seem to hold good whether his non-resistance is for truth's sake or for fellowship's sake.

(2)

We have in this chapter hitherto considered the question of resistance and non-resistance from the point of view of the private person, whether it be he himself or a third party that is injured. This has been necessary in order to deal with the matter under simpler conditions than those involved in corporate coercion, which is, however, the more pressing question.

In approaching the question of legal coercion, we have to note that there are certain differences between it and the chivalrous coercion which is exercised by a private person in defence of another, but the situation is in essence the same. The community in its legal executive stands in fundamentally the same moral relationship to the criminal as one individual does to another whom he finds wronging a third. And since in this corporate reaction of the community against the evil-doer there is always a third party concerned, it has to act in conditions in which non-resistance is not generally applicable. But in this respect the corporate action of the community through its legal executives must not be confused with the individual's invocation of the law, which may come within the limits in which the principle of non-resistance is applicable; it may often be best if the injured, for the wrong-doer's sake, refrains from invoking the protection of the law, and the conditions that determine whether this should be done in any particular case are similar to those already discussed in connection with purely individual action. And it may be noted that the existence of legal powers, to which the injured

man might appeal but does not, will add to the effect of his non-resistance upon the evil-doer, showing again that the two methods of dealing with evil are not fundamentally antagonistic.

One difference between individual and corporate resistance of evil is that, in the nature of the case, the community's legal representatives can only in exceptional cases be present when the criminal act is afoot, so that normally its resistance of evil is not preventive coercion but deterrent penalty, in which it is like parental coercion. For the same reason interposition between the wrong-doer and the wronged is generally impossible as a corporate act of the community. We shall, however, see that by means of the opprobrium which the incurrence of legal penalty generally brings with it the law dissuades from wrong by an appeal to the conscience in a way equivalent to the verbal appeal of one man to another.

Another very important difference is that legal (or governmental) coercion, in addition to the functions just mentioned, in which it is analogous to individual action, discharges the very important service of securing order, which is essential for moral progress, and also of making possible certain very useful corporate activities which contribute to the same end.

It may be maintained that if the community was composed of Christians sufficiently eager for the redemption of the criminal, the occasion for coercion would not arise; but this involves the entirely unwarranted supposition that persuasion or non-resistance would be always sufficient. We have seen that where a third party is concerned the method of non-resistance loses its power of

appeal, but apart from this, even under the best conditions, non-resistance is by no means sure enough of its results to meet the corporate needs that have created legal coercion.

The way in which Christianity survived centuries of persecution and finally became the religion of the Empire is sometimes cited as a proof of the power of non-resistance. But this argument confuses the power of non-resistant suffering in overcoming the evil in the hearts of those who inflict it with the power of martyrdom in propagating the truth. It is not necessary to discuss in this connection the question as to the motive with which the early Christians accepted martyrdom or as to the extent to which resistance was a practical possibility, but if we ask, "Does the fact that the unresisting Christian Church survived persecution and triumphed over its persecutors give us warrant for believing that non-resistance is a moral power of a sort capable of effectively replacing governmental coercion in the protection of the weak and the maintenance of order?" we find a decided answer by asking another question, "In how many cases did the non-resistance of the early Christian affect his persecutor sufficiently to secure the cessation of his persecution?" And this question makes it clear that if we take the history of the early Church as evidence of what can be done in the prevention of evil by submitting to it, then that history shows that the method of non-resistance is by no means sufficiently reliable in the prevention of evil to replace governmental coercion. As a matter of fact, it was just because their non-resistance, whether voluntary or involuntary, made so little difference to their

persecutors' intent and seldom if ever prevented the evil deed and saved these early Christians from death, that their witness to the faith was so effective. For when the world saw men and women so certain of the hereafter that they laid down their lives lightly, it became convinced that these people had just the assurance that it most wanted—the assurance of a blessed immortality.

Non-resistance is thus seen to be incapable of replacing governmental coercion for the purpose of securing order and protecting the weak. We have seen something of the necessity of a certain order as a condition of moral development. We have also seen that in the corporate resistance of the evil-doer which we call penal law there is always a third party, and that when there is a third party non-resistance must, even for the sake of the wrong-doer, be replaced by effective protection of the wronged. And we shall now review certain considerations under these two heads in connection with governmental coercion.

In corroboration of the assertion that legal coercion is still needful for the maintenance of moral development we may remember that in the absence of effective criminal law crime always gives rise to private reprisals and so to endless vendetta, and that in the absence of reliable and powerful civil courts the disputes which they would otherwise settle become material for settlement by private violence. These things happen wherever government is weak, and result in a lowering of the general level of civilization and morality.

We have seen how settled life, with its higher moral possibilities, was possible only as the agricultural peoples were able to defend the more

valuable possessions of settled life from the predacious attacks of the nomads. The coercive power of government in its legal activities secures the individual against predatory individuals within its own borders. The absence or weakness of government reduces relations to those of

The simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can,

when no high development of culture or morals is possible for a people. Those who speak of law as the defence of property against the unpropertied forget that the reason why law in law-abiding times seems so often (though we shall see that there is another side to this appearance) to defend the "haves" against the "have-nots" is because it has dealt so successfully with the sort of spoliation of the "have-nots" by the "haves" which is the common feature of lawless times. When we remember that upon security of property depends not only the possession of a home and the means for all that the home can achieve in moral development, but also all except the very lowest degree of co-operation for cultural or philanthropic or religious purposes, it will appear to what extent the highest development of the race depends upon such security as has nowhere been obtained and does not at present exist without governmental coercion.

It is only at its beginnings that governmental activity is confined to the maintenance of order. At an early stage public works are undertaken,—roads, harbours, water supply, and other essentials

to culture and health. We find with rare exceptions that where such services are not undertaken by government, they are not undertaken at all. In the next chapter we shall see something of the extent to which this branch of governmental activity has grown and of the extent to which compulsion is an essential element in this activity. In the meantime we may note that the provision of a currency is one of the oldest and commonest of governmental functions, and it is clear to what extent both the facility and the morality of trade must depend on the strict suppression of all attempts to make or pass counterfeit coin. It may perhaps be said that the existence of money has not contributed to the moral elevation of the human race, but even if this were so, it is not the point of the matter. Money would have existed and been used whether governments had undertaken coinage or not. What they have undoubtedly done by undertaking this service is enormously to diminish the possibilities of evil attendant upon the use of money and enormously to increase its serviceableness.

All these things are either needful or helpful to moral development, and there is no proof whatever that they would be possible heretofore or now without legal coercion. He who condemns the use of force for such ends must either show that social order and security of property are neither essential nor helpful to moral life or that they can be otherwise obtained in the world in which he lives.

He has also to justify his participation in benefits which at the present stage of the world's development are nowhere obtained, and so far as we can

see could not be obtained, otherwise than by legal coercion. We shall have to return to this point in the next chapter, and in the meantime need consider the position only in regard to what we have seen to be one of the oldest concerns of law, the enforcement of rights of private property. Where that right is not enforced there cannot be security of private property to the extent necessary for the development of the higher forms of self-realization and self-expression and especially for the more intimate and higher forms of fellowship, such as the home and all the other institutions of human collaboration and communion.

St. Francis of Assisi saw clearly the connection between the possession of property and coercion. In answer to the Bishop of Assisi's objection, "Your way of living without owning anything seems to me harsh and difficult," "My lord," he replied, "if we possessed property, we should have need of arms for its defence. . . ." The condemnation of all coercion should thus carry with it the refusal to own property, and this again would involve celibacy as with the Franciscans. Even so, the Franciscan life was consistent only on the assumption (which St. Francis seems to have made) that it was neither possible nor desirable for all; for the friars depended upon the charity of those who possessed, while every individual of them owed his existence to the fact that his parents had not accepted the ideal of celibacy which he professed.

The inconsistency between the condemnation of all coercion and the possession of property cannot be solved by a man's saying that he will not invoke the powers of the State for the protection

of his property, for the fact that the risk he runs by this resolve is so small as still to leave it worth his while to acquire and accumulate property is itself the result of the general enforcement of the rights of property by the State. And every investment and insurance and use of monetary security involves values in property that depend directly upon the power and intention of others to use the protection of the law when necessary.

He therefore who condemns all use of coercion but accepts these benefits, which at this stage of the world's development are not to be had without coercion, cannot escape the challenge that he condones by act what he condemns by word.

We have now to consider legal coercion in its effects upon the evil-doer. No doubt all existing penal codes leave much to be desired in this respect, but this is due to a special and important complication which will be dealt with in the next chapter. For the present we shall confine ourselves to dealing generally with the matter.

We have seen in the case of chivalry that the use of force to prevent the ill deed was, when other means failed, the only way through which redemptive love could work. And the case is not essentially different in legal punishment. The legal penalty no doubt lacks the moral impressiveness of the chivalry that accepts personal risk and damage for the sake of the injured. But on the other hand the law is morally impressive by its very impersonality, and it has the advantage of standing obviously and recognizedly for the common will for the common good. From this it seems to follow that penal law is a necessary

element in the redemptive agencies of the world. To what extent any existing system realizes this possibility is another question, but there are certain facts that go to show that, to some extent at least, they do so and that therefore they are not essentially incapable of being the instrument of goodwill, which would be the case if all coercion was in itself wrong.

We have first the fact that legal punishment does undoubtedly in some cases have a reformatory effect. Thomas Holmes, the London police-court commissioner, whose knowledge of criminals is extensive, and who has spent his life in frequently successful endeavour to reclaim them, writes of them and their punishment: "I am speaking from a long experience, during which I have dealt personally with individuals and have taken infinite pains to learn something of those individuals. From this knowledge and experience I am forced to the conclusion that, as a rule, it is not a wise or a good thing to prevent the consequence of crime falling upon the criminal" (*Known to the Police*, chap. vi.).

Whenever punishment is an element in moral reformation it is because the wrong-doer acknowledges that he deserves it: like the penitent on the cross he must say, "We receive the due reward of our deeds." But if this sense of desert is of the sort that looks upon the penalty merely as so much pain suffered for so much evil done, which thus squares accounts with humanity, it leaves the criminal precisely where he was. These facts remind us that of the three motives in the infliction of legal penalty, (1) the retributive, for the satisfaction of justice, (2) the deterrent,

for the protection of society, (3) the reformatory, for the saving of the criminal, the third is ineffective without the other two. The retributive element in penal justice has its oldest source partly in the indignation of the injured as sympathetically shared by the community, i.e., it is partly a communal transformation of individual vengeance. A more important strand of it is the parental or protective instinct outraged by the injury of the weak. But by the process of becoming a communal activity both these are not only limited, regulated and ensured, but are transformed into an act in which the prevention of deeds detrimental to the public good is the chief conscious motive. The element of moral indignation must continue, for though the criminal suffers for the public good, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between his suffering and that of the man who undergoes suffering for the public good without having incurred it by crime. By willingly accepting the punishment in this sense, as inflicted for the common good and yet as fully earned by his misdeed, the wrong-doer can renounce and depart from his anti-social attitude and make the acceptance of punishment the beginning of a new relationship to society. This is an instance in communal action of the paradox we found in individual action, that if resistance to the evil-doer was to be effective for his redemption it must have other motives than to redeem him. If the motive of legal penalty was only the reformation of the criminal, it could work on him only through fear, and so effect no true reformation, and give no means of abandoning the self-preference that lay at the root of his crime.

These considerations will help to answer those who believe that God punishes sin, but deny that man has any right to do so, since, they say, God alone can judge justly what a man deserves. This seems to misconstrue both human and divine law so far as it inflicts penalties. To assume that God's justice consists of inflicting an amount of pain exactly proportioned to human iniquity is a purely dogmatic assumption founded on the unethical notion that it is possible to equate so much moral evil with so much suffering. The only penalties imposed by God of which we have any knowledge are of another sort: they are penalties incurred as the result of breaking laws. There are various "natural" laws that concern our health and safety, and he who disobeys suffers disablement or pain or death. There are intellectual and moral and spiritual laws that we cannot break with impunity, and whose transgression brings penalties that may be worse than pain and death. And we believe that these laws were established by God as necessary to the achievement of his purpose of common good. The incurrence of the penalty is not always due to moral wrong, but when it is so, then the humble acceptance of the penalty is a way to moral renewal. Human law is fundamentally the same: it declares, "For the sake of the common good, be it enacted that he who does such and such things shall suffer such and such penalties." It does not attempt to pronounce upon the exact degree of moral guilt in the delinquent. There is certainly a retributive element in penal law, which we have seen to have great moral importance, but legally this element is quite subordinate and persists chiefly

to prevent a misunderstanding of the nature of the suffering inflicted as punishment. The subordination of this element appears when we ask what constitutes a just punishment: we recognize that the prescription of eye for eye no longer commends itself as just, or in the great majority of cases as even possible. The only answer tolerable to-day is that a just penalty is the least penalty that will form an efficient deterrent. So that the very obvious fact that man is not omniscient cannot be brought as an objection to the imposition of legal penalties, for there is no attempt thereby to assess the exact degree of guilt: the attempt is to protect the common good by preventing certain acts. And as we have seen, the penalties of God are very closely analogous. We may perhaps be accused of confusing natural law with penal law, but when human penal law is condemned by comparing it with divine action, we are entitled to point out that the divine activity in comparison with which it is condemned exists only in unethical dogma, while such divine activity as we do know is analogous to human penal law in so far as it is instituted for the common good, and imposes suffering upon those who infringe it, which suffering is not exactly proportioned to moral desert.

The moral capabilities of a penal system are seen not only in its directly reformatory effects but also in the fact that other redemptive means can be used in co-operation with it. Cases are not lacking in which prison officials have found in their position the means to effect a moral change in their charges by engaging their

confidence and friendship. And the operations of the law are often the occasion for bringing the criminal under helpful influence that is without other means of reaching him.

But the moral value of a penal code must not be judged only by its effect upon those who suffer its penalties. Probably the greater part of its work for good is done in withholding men from the crime to which they are tempted. Nor can it be said that its appeal is merely to fear and therefore not truly moral, for if dread of the penalty were the only deterrent factor, then it would deter a man as strongly after his first sentence as before, which is certainly not the case ; for generally shame is a far stronger deterrent than fear, and the shame of imprisonment once incurred is much less deeply felt on subsequent occasions. It may be said that, even so, shame is not a truly moral motive. But shame exists only because and when there is also a sense of moral wrong : those who go to prison for what they believe to be right are not ashamed. Those who are tempted to crime find in the penal system an expression of the public conscience, which, despite the presence of other factors, does make an appeal to their conscience, and so fulfils the part of reasoning with them before proceeding to other measures.

And even in cases where the moral element in the fear of the law is at a minimum, it often seems that the law with its coercive powers must be the first stimulus to moral development. In cases of callous or insolent disregard of others' sufferings or safety coercion seems an essential element in any remedial treatment. Just as the

first recognition of a distinction between self and not-self is said to come in the experience of resistance, so those beneath a certain level of moral development seem to need the experience of a power that can command and enforce its commands in order to awaken their recognition of the existence and importance of other interests than their own.

And in this connection we may finally note that if coercion is an essentially wrong way of dealing with crime, we should expect the penal system inevitably to deteriorate, for that which is essentially evil can develop only by becoming more patently so. But it cannot be denied that in many states the criminal code and penal system have developed for the better.

(3)

We have now to consider the ethical aspect of the question of resistance and non-resistance as involved in inter-state relationships. In applying here the results of our examination of the cases where individuals alone were concerned we find that certain important conditions must be taken into account :—

(1) When one state deals with another we are apt to judge the transaction as though it were that of two individuals, and we need to remember that such a view is nearly always misleading. One state can seldom act towards another as though it were one individual dealing with another, for some of its own subjects nearly always occupy the place of the third party in the transaction.

Inter-state actions must therefore not be judged as though they were the actions of a single man responsible for no interests but his own: they are rather the actions of a father where the interests of his family are involved; and a single man without responsibilities may be right in taking risks and making sacrifices that would be wrong for the father of a family. Even with the unanimous consent of its adults no government would be justified in allowing what would prejudice the interests of its children. This consideration does not, of course, justify the purely self-regarding attitude so common to governments in their international relationships: upon the father of a family falls the duty not only of providing and protecting the material conditions needful for the physical and mental and spiritual development of his children, but also of so ordering his relationships with the outside world that his children may learn from him to live for something wider and higher than family ends. It is too seldom that actions, such as the attempts to suppress the African slave trade, have been undertaken by states for the benefit of those who are not their own subjects.

(2) Another fact of great importance is that the moral level of relationships between states is far behind that obtaining between individuals of the same state. International relationships are largely on the level that obtained between individuals before there was any corporate coercion of conduct: they have hardly begun to emerge from the savage level at which custom is everything and the moral differentiation is non-existent, apparently because there has never been an in-

stitution that could do for states what the institution of penal law did for the individual. It is true that there is a so-called international law, but it amounts in effect to little more than custom, and there is nothing which in international relationships distinguishes between custom and moral right. T. J. Lawrence, in *Principles of International Law*, says, "International law may be defined as the rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilized states in their dealings with one another" (p. 1): "In the definition no mention is made of the rights and obligations of states" (p. 2). Further on he says that the "presence in a state paper" of "appeals to natural right or innate principles of justice and humanity . . . is a pretty sure sign that international law is hopelessly against the contentions of its authors" (p. 20). The observance of this code of custom is rather a matter of convenience than of moral obligation. And it would be difficult to find historic evidence to contradict the assertion that states consider themselves justified, when concerns more valuable than the goodwill of their neighbours are at stake, in repudiating any article of international law. Another evidence of the pre-moral nature of inter-state conduct is found in the entire absence from history of anything approaching national repentance for any inter-state act.

Now we saw that the meaning and power of non-resistance of evil depended upon the existence of a generally accepted distinction between moral right and wrong, and that before the sense of this distinction had emerged such teaching as that of Matt. v 38-41 would be meaningless, and we

now see that in international relationships this distinction has no recognized place, and that therefore, speaking formally, any act of international non-resistance (whether in conditions analogous to those that would make it right for the individual or not) would be without meaning or justification. But this would not be strictly true to fact, for the men and women that compose a state are capable of understanding and feeling the force of such an appeal, and public opinion, if strong enough, may allow or even compel the government to relinquish the logic of its position.

So that taking all considerations into account, it still seems that there is room under certain circumstances for the non-resistance principle in inter-state relations. And we see here the essential part of the positive element in the injunctions of Jesus in Matt. v. 38-41, for mere non-resistance in inter-state matters would almost inevitably be interpreted as cowardice, whilst a positive generosity of response would almost inevitably result in friendship.

But the limits to non-resistance appear where conditions needful for the moral welfare of a state's subjects are at stake. The government of a civilized state would be inflicting a moral wrong upon any portion of its people which it surrendered to alien rule, for, as we have seen, at a characteristic stage of development very common in modern western civilization an alien rule is a hindrance to the moral development of the people. The observance of these limits, however, would still leave considerable scope for the principle of non-resistance, for international differences may concern matters like commercial

advantage, and superiority in wealth is not a condition of moral development. But when conditions necessary for the moral development of its subjects are jeopardized, it would seem that a state is morally committed to defensive war. For here, in so far as moral considerations can, because of the moral level of the individuals composing the state, become a factor in inter-state relations, it is necessary for the sake of the wrong-doer to resist him, as otherwise the state would show more consideration for the enemies' physical or moral welfare than for those of its own subjects, and would therefore confirm the very self-preference of the enemy, that is at the root of its moral evil.

Under certain circumstances, therefore, war may be a moral duty, and a means to the conservation of moral good. And this conclusion is confirmed by the experience that armed resistance may sometimes be the obviously successful means of redemptive love. The following well-known incident may serve to illustrate this connection: In 1818, Tamatoe, King of Huahine, one of the South Sea Islands, became a Christian. He discovered a plot on the part of certain heathen islanders to attack and seize him and fellow-Christians and burn them to death. He organized resistance, came upon the enemy as they landed, and overcame them. But, once overcome, the enemy were kindly treated and set down to a banquet. This unexpected treatment so overcame their souls that some of them could eat nothing, and the ultimate result was that those who came to burn the Christians returned to burn their idols. Is it likely that non-resistance would

have been equally effective in impressing the savage heart with the spirit of Jesus Christ?

Other complicating conditions of inter-state relationships which are factors in the moral question relate to modern developments, and will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here we have only two more points to consider.

An objection is often raised against war by those who allow a place for legal and other coercion. They grant that coercion plays a part in the moral education and redemption of man, but maintain that killing, because it puts an end to your relations with a man, cannot serve these purposes. But those who argue thus fail to recognize that any act, if it is to help a man morally, must have and express an equal regard for the highest good of all concerned. It is morally good for a man to live in a world with others who hold certain values dearer than his or their lives: it would be morally bad for a man to live with those who held no value dearer than his life. It cannot be morally bad that a conviction necessary to a man's moral good should find expression in action, which in this case involves the jeopardizing of his life, when by his own act he compels others to choose between his safety and these higher values. He is killed not as a means to his moral development, but as the inevitable result of a condition that is necessary for his and others' moral good.

We have finally to consider the underlying motive of nearly all pacifism—the repugnance which every sensitive man feels at the thought of wounding or killing a fellow-man, especially in the conditions obtaining in war. This feeling

is morally one of the most valuable acquisitions of humanity, and is undoubtedly an essential of any spirit that has a claim to be called Christian. No lover of man will belittle the horrors of war.

But no feeling, however natural or commendable, can by itself determine the rightness of the line of conduct that satisfies it. It may be easier to be killed than to kill, but because one of two alternatives is easier than the other, that is no proof that it is right. Until a feeling and its sequent act are seen and judged in the light of all the interests involved, we ought not to act upon it. We may shrink from a line of action, but may see that not to take it will involve consequences still more repugnant. We may rightly shrink from a certain act because we see that it destroys certain values, but may also see that to omit it will involve the destruction of higher values, and so may find it right to do the thing which it is right to shrink from doing.

Despite the horrors of wounding and killing everyone acknowledges that there are higher values than those of health and life which are thus destroyed, and that amongst these higher values are those of a moral sort. It therefore follows that the refusal to participate in any war must justify itself by denying that man is ever in a position where he must choose between these two sorts of value. We have seen that such a supposition is untenable. The characteristic evil of wrong done upon persons is that it inflicts a moral injury by making it harder for them to be their best, and since this result can generally be diminished by preventing the evil act even though the evil will remains, it follows that wherever this

is so we have to choose between inflicting the loss of the lower values upon the aggressor or permitting the loss of the higher values by his victims. In such a case the aggressor must be resisted for his own sake, since non-resistance would be a direct confirmation of the evil assumption that his own physical well-being was of more importance than the moral well-being of others. And such a case occurs when moral values are threatened, as we have seen they may be, by military aggression.

This consideration makes clear the difference between the position of a man whose country is unjustly attacked and that of a man facing the sorts of evil described by Jesus in Matt. v. 39-41, for the action there enjoined does positively and unmistakably put moral values above physical by seeking fellowship at the cost of personal ease and convenience, whereas failure to resist the attempt to impose upon a country conditions that are morally detrimental would not express this preference in any intelligible or forcible way.

It may perhaps be rejoined that if all evil-doing inflicts a moral injury upon the victim, it would follow that non-resistance is never right, for a man has no more right to allow himself to suffer moral injury than to allow it to be inflicted upon others. The answer to this depends upon the fact that the different elements in the injury produce different results upon different people. It must be remembered that Jesus in Matt. v. 38-41 is speaking to his followers, i.e., to those who accept his teaching and are therefore at a high level of moral development; and at this level it is possible to convert physical

and material disabilities into moral advantage, so that it is not necessary to prevent the physical or material damage for the sake of moral good, and it must be remembered that there are limits even to this, for it requires a very lofty character if the infliction of unjust and serious loss of property or physical damage is to make right living no harder. But to the follower of Jesus the real moral injury is the ill-will behind the damaging deed : he can never be the better for that : it cannot but depress him and make it harder for him to be his best. And yet he cannot prevent the ill-will : it is already there in the very attempt to injure, and since co-operation is far more likely than resistance to overcome the ill-will and convert it to good, he must show a ready co-operation with all that is at his disposal, even at the cost of increasing the physical or material damage ; for he can convert physical loss to spiritual gain, while the ill-will remains a hurt to him as long as it persists. On the other hand the vast majority of those in any country, i.e., all the children and others who have not yet reached the level of accepting the teaching of Jesus with anything like seriousness, are below that level at which the physical and material damage of an inflicted wrong may be converted into moral advantage, and therefore such damage wrongly inflicted on them will be actual moral injury, and must at all cost be prevented.

The pacifist position involves a dilemma. For if aggressive violence can injure moral values, violence is justified in defence of them. But if aggressive violence cannot injure moral values,

wherein lies its wrong? And much more so, wherein then lies the evil of defensive violence? The pacifist cannot deny that coercion inflicts a moral injury, for he condemns defensive war on the ground that it makes it more difficult for the wrong-doer to repent. But if, as he asserts, defensive war inflicts a moral handicap upon the wanton aggressor, can it be maintained that aggressive violence inflicts no moral injury upon its victims? We return thus to the conclusion that we have found before, that the pacifist position involves the assumption that there is no difference in moral result between just and unjust coercion, except that here it seems to imply that of the two, unjust coercion is the less harmful.

While therefore all Christians must share the pacifist's abhorrence of inflicting wounds and death and of participating in the horrors of war, it must be recognized that there are worse evils than these, because there are higher values than health and life, higher even than the health and life of our fellows; and the actual conditions of life do undoubtedly bring occasions in which we have to choose between these lower and higher values.

CHAPTER V

MODERN CONDITIONS

A GENERAL examination of the factors involved has confirmed the conclusion that Jesus intended by the instances given in Matt. v. 38-41 to impose limits upon the method there enjoined of treating the evil-doer. And we have seen that beyond these limits the ends of love need, and can be best served by, a use of coercion, including the corporate use of it both in penal legislation and, under certain conditions, in war.

We have now further to consider the problem in certain aspects of its concrete complexity, introducing factors which, for simplicity's sake, have been hitherto omitted and putting the necessary emphasis upon others of especially modern growth.

(1)

In the first place, in view of the importance of legislation, an adequate discussion of the ethics of coercion must take into account the fact that the corporate activity of any community is bound to be generally on a lower moral level than that of its best members, because it represents the will of the majority. This is to some extent true under any form of government, for even an absolute monarchy cannot long enforce a thoroughly un-

popular law. It is much more generally true under modern democratic forms of government, where it is recognized as useless to legislate ahead of public opinion. The legal enactments of a democratic government cannot be far from the level of the average moral attainment of its subjects, and are therefore of necessity at some distance below the level of the best of them. And yet, despite this fact, we have seen how immensely important corporate activity has been in moral development. And it is generally agreed that the democratization of corporate activity is an important factor in the further moral development of the race.

To see that corporate activity cannot but be on a moral level lower than that of the state's best citizens is to find help in the elucidation of several problems.

It sometimes appears as though all practical politics consisted of compromise, and the word has an unpleasant sound. But since politics always concern governmental activity, political compromise is of two different sorts. It may mean moral surrender. It may also mean a just recognition of the difference between individual and corporate action in view of the fact that the corporate acts of a political body must of necessity be on a level below that of its best members. It may be either the sale of principle for power or the right acceptance of the limits of a trust ; and the same deed may quite possibly appear under either of these two colours to both the politician and his critics. It is clear that the acts of a democratically representative government ought to represent roughly the will of the community, and,

if they do not, there has been a misuse of entrusted power, whether the act is too far below or too far above the general moral level. A man entrusted with the affairs of another has no right out of them to contribute to charities, however needy and noble, beyond what he knows to be the will of his principal.

The freedom and responsibility of an elected government are limited, for it is not appointed to act entirely according to its own wisdom or desire, but rather to interpret and carry out the will of the people. The members of a government may not act quite as they would like to, but are bound by limits set by the public will. They can, of course, influence public thought, and are in an advantageous position to do so, and they have a margin of liberty between what would be too far behind and what would be too far ahead of public opinion, but broadly and ultimately the responsibility lies with the people.

But it is of measureless importance to the community that the limited freedom and power which the government does possess should be used rightly, and therefore that they should be in the hands of the best citizens. And since to undertake government is to agree to carry out the will of the people, which is morally lower than that of the best citizens, the common good demands the putting of good men into a position where they will be the executors of a will that is morally lower than their own. And this must be taken into account when moral judgment is passed upon the acts of a government, as otherwise both the politician and his critic are put into a false position. It is no disproof of this general truth to find that a

government or its members may, on occasion, be morally right to resign their position rather than carry out the public will. For such an act would seem to be morally justified only when it appears to those concerned that the public will falls below its normal or changes radically from what it was when they were appointed.

These considerations apply not only to members of a government: they touch generally any participation in politics. Considering the issues at stake, it is of utmost importance that the best people of a state should be busy with its politics, but here, too, it must be remembered that, since effective legislation cannot be far from the average moral level of the population, practical measures will be below the moral level of the best citizens. They ought therefore to recognize that what they have to do is not to propose and push measures from their own moral level, which would lead only to reaction, but to initiate and support legislation on as high a moral level as is compatible with the general will, though it may be below that which they have accepted for themselves. Their special business as practical politicians is to discriminate the better elements of public opinion and by pushing for the expression of these in legislation to give them permanence and stability in their conflict with the lower elements.

The necessary closeness of governmental acts to the average moral level of the nation has an important bearing on the relationship of the Church to politics. Unless the Church stands for a higher moral standard than that which is accepted by the community generally, and unless she has

a right to expect from her members a level of moral life higher than that which obtains generally, she is wrong both in attempt and achievement. Only so can she help to lift the general will to a higher level, and this lifting of the general will is her invaluable contribution to politics. Her whole witness is that the general will is too low. But it is right for the government to represent the general will, so that when the criticism of the Church falls upon the government rather than upon the popular will behind it, she attributes to government a liberty of action that does not exist, and so criticizes unfairly and shows herself out of touch with facts. Any just moral criticism of governmental action involves the tacit acceptance of a moral level not far from that of the average of the populace, and therefore involves the abandonment of the Church's peculiar trust. Of course, a government may be morally to blame either for not carrying out the public will or for not influencing it rightly, or for not making right use of the margin of liberty which belongs to it. But it is very questionable, even if the Church takes the first step necessary for justice and makes allowance for the difference between her own standard and that imposed by popular will upon the government, whether she is then in a position to judge accurately and speak authoritatively on any of these points. Can she say that in a particular governmental act advantage is not taken of the margin of governmental liberty? The government might reply that in their opinion the public will was not ripe for anything better. And it does not appear that the Church is in any better position than the government to judge upon this

question. The matter is one of the actual state of the country's moral life, and the Church's proper work is to lift that to what it ought to be, and not so much to question the government's estimate of what it is: if she does the former effectively her work will speak for itself with an authority that no government can question. In the long run it is only through her power here that the Church can influence the government beneficially, and this power is diminished by any activity on her part that involves the recognition of a lower moral standard than that to which she is bound.

And here we must include the Church's advocacy of definite political measures. To be practical politically a measure must be not far from the general moral level of the community, so that in advocating definite political measures the Church must either be asking for an impossibility or must appear to accept a moral standard below that to which she is committed.

It is unwise to say that there may not be exceptions to this general rule, but it seems that on the whole the Church should confine her political activities to raising the moral level of the community, and to urging upon her members the duty of taking part in politics.

The question may here be provoked: "Why ought the Church to urge her members to those political activities from which she ought herself to abstain?" The answer lies in remembering that the moral average which expresses itself in legislation is really a balance of strains. The most important thing in politics from a moral point of view is the respective strength of these

contending strains. Legislation is the resultant or compromise of these various forces, and practical politics concerns itself with the determination and fixture of the resultant. The Church ought to represent the strongest upward strain in the moral life of the community, and she serves this end best by concentrating her endeavour upon a moral standard far in advance of any possible legislation. To demand possible legislation is to lower her standard and so to weaken her authority and to dissipate upon that which other institutions could do better the energy that is needed for that which she can do best. The Church can keep apart from politics in a way in which her members cannot: they have the vote, and not to use it is to use it badly. The moral good of the community, so far as it is affected by legislation, depends on the well informed and unremitting use of the vote by its best citizens, amongst whom the Church must reckon her members, and must therefore urge them to this duty. Some of the members of the Church also are men possessing high qualifications for politics, and therefore peculiarly able to help the community to the best embodiment of its various moral strains in practical legislation, an invaluable service which it is essential that Christian men should render. All practical politics are more or less of a bargain between the spirit and the flesh; but saints are not necessarily good bargainers, so that for the Church as such to attempt the business is likely to prove disastrous. But it is absolutely necessary for the good of the world that the spirit should be well represented at the bargaining, and therefore the Church, keeping out of it herself, must

urge to it those of her members whose talent is for the business.

We saw that corporate activity has contributed great and otherwise unobtainable advantages in the moral advance of the race. If we add to this the consideration at present under discussion, that corporate activity can only be on a level of moral mediocrity, we get light on certain other problems of practical ethics. We see that in determining the right or wrong of participating in governmental activity we must estimate the value of this activity as a whole, recognizing that if it is to be at all it must be on a level below that of the state's best citizens. Government could not exist, certainly could not thrive, without the service of many whose consciences do not approve the whole body of its legislation. And if we ask, "Should a man then assist to carry out a law which he thinks unjust?" we need to see that if we say, "No," it would mean that no man should act as judge or policeman unless he agreed with the whole of the existing law, and the extreme rarity of such men would make all administration of law impossible. The very essence of law is that it is the will of the community and not of the individual, and if we agree that the corporate action of the community in law is a benefit to humanity, it is enough to justify our participation, even though we do not approve of every detail of the law we have to administer.

These considerations also touch the question of war. We have seen that under certain conditions war becomes a moral duty. But war, being a corporate activity, must always in a world of imperfect people be carried on in a spirit and

in ways something below the moral level attained by the best of the people concerned. From this it arises that a man may on occasion find it right for him to assist in a war undertaken in conditions in which, if all had been like himself, there would have been no war. On the other hand, it will make him chary of advising war even of the most chivalrous sort, because he knows that it entails the co-operation of those who are not inclined to be chivalrous, and who will to some extent debase its spirit and divert its purpose.

The fact that governmental activity in the present state of the world cannot be on the highest moral level has a bearing also on a certain phase of the pacifist question. For those who do not deny a certain efficacy to coercion in dealing with evil, but who maintain that non-resistance is always applicable and always better, must take into consideration that even if this is granted, still since the corporate activity of a community can never be on the highest level, the only possible corporate reaction against evil will be that of resistance. So that the question is whether or no they will participate in the only possible corporate reaction against evil. To refuse is tantamount to denying that coercion can do any good in the resistance of evil, i.e., that there is any moral gain in using just coercion to prevent unjust coercion.

The reply may be: "Our refusal to participate in corporate coercion of evil is not intended to imply a denial of all efficacy to it, but is based on the reason that participation in the lower would weaken and obscure our witness to the higher, which is of greater gain to the community than

anything that would be gained by our participation in war."

But people are more likely to take suggestion as to a better way to their end from those who share their present effort than from those who stand aloof in order to call attention to what is claimed to be a better way, especially when the superiority of the advocated alternative has yet to be demonstrated. And a special line of action taken mainly to advertise its own moral superiority is not likely to be very effective to this end. The only moral witness that is, as a rule, truly effective is that of the act done on its own merits and without thought of setting an example to others.

Here, too, we find an answer to those who acknowledge that coercion might play a part in diminishing crime, but maintain that owing to the defects of our present penal system no Christian could have anything to do with it. Doubtless our penal system, like all others, is far from perfect. But since the penal system is a corporate activity it is bound to be at some distance from the way in which the best men would deal with the problem of crime were it freely in their hands. The choice is between an imperfect system and none. So that to refuse co-operation with the existing method because of its imperfection is to imply that it would be preferable if there were no enforcement of law at all; and in view of the part that law plays and has played in the moral development of the race such an assumption contradicts all history.

It is sometimes argued, from the frequency with which a man who has incurred one sentence will incur others, that our present penal system

results only in making a hardened criminal of the man who has once broken the law. No doubt wiser treatment might diminish the number of second sentences, but their present frequency by no means proves that the abolition of the penal system would lessen crime. For whether wrong-doing is penalized or not it tends to be repeated. There is no doubt that the man who has once given way to lying or drunkenness or sexual vice is far more likely to do so again than is the first offender to appear again for a second crime, which shows that, imperfect as the law is, it does make repetition of wrong-doing less frequent than it would otherwise be, and that the frequency of second sentences may be accounted for by the innate tendency of wrong-doing to repeat itself.

(2)

When we come, as we must now do, to consider modern developments and conditions of corporate activity in their relation to the rightness or wrongness of coercion, we need to remind ourselves again of the essential connection between coercion and civil government.

It is precisely the use of coercion that differentiates civil government from all other corporate human activities. The government of a country claims a monopoly of coercion, all coercion within its limits being either authorized, delegated, allowed or suppressed by it. It is non-voluntary in constitution: men are born subjects of a government as they are born members of a family; and wherever a man goes he enters willy-nilly into

governmentally determined conditions of life and conduct.

Coercion is an essential and characteristic element in legislation, which with its execution is the proper function of civil government. No doubt legislation, especially in a democratic country, is ineffective unless it approximately expresses the will of the people. But the essential difference between the expression of the will of the people in legislation and otherwise is that legislation compels the recalcitrant minority. Where a people is unanimous no legislation is needed: where unanimity is not needed for the result and a few exceptions are immaterial, there is no legislation. But where the efficiency of the general will needs a universal conformity which is not likely to be voluntary, there is found the essential office of government, which is to define the general will and supply the necessary coercion. And therefore since the *differentia* of corporate activity in civil government is the use of coercion, to condemn all coercion is to condemn all civil government.

We have further seen that, besides exercising coercion upon evil within their borders, governments must resist aggression from without, and that an effective internal administration is impossible without readiness to defend itself from external interference: the two are inseparably interrelated, and apparently will be until all states are combined in a unity which can do for them as states what they each do for their subjects in the matter of coercing wrong.

We are faced therefore, as Tolstoy saw quite clearly, with the choice of either accepting the

use of coercion,—and of imperfectly used coercion,—both in law and war, or of having to renounce all use of the advantages of governmental activities and to convict them of inability to conserve moral good or to promote moral development. It is to the consideration of these activities that we must now turn.

One of the features of modern life is the great development of the services of public utility rendered by corporate action of the sort that depends ultimately upon legal coercion. Such services as those of roads, bridges, drainage, street cleaning and lighting, supply of water, gas and electricity, railways, tramways, post, telegraph, telephone, etc., are all of them either government or municipal concerns or the work of companies given special rights to be enforced by law. And under the present conditions they would all be impossible apart from legal coercion. No municipal activities of the sort would be possible without the power to enforce the payment of rates. Consider the attempt to make and keep the roads and streets of a city on a voluntary basis. The vast majority of the people would say, "We are quite willing to bear our share of the cost, but we refuse to pay also the share of others who are quite able to afford it but will take the benefit for nothing if they can get it." Consider the possibility of running a tram or train service without enforcing payment either from the traveller or from the taxpayer.

It cannot be denied that these services are a benefit to mankind and contribute very considerably, if indirectly, to moral development, especially such of them as make for health and means of

communication. Is it wrong to compel a few men in a city to pay for privileges which they enjoy rather than to allow the whole city to suffer the inevitable results of private water supply and drainage? In such cases, coercion, far from having the brutalizing effects sometimes attributed to it, is probably wholesome and educative to those upon whom it is exercised.

Probably the instance in which indubitable benefit to mankind is most observably and directly connected with governmental coercion is seen in the enforced notification, segregation and disinfection in cases of infectious disease. All voluntary philanthropic endeavours to minimize disease are small in their effects compared with what has been achieved in recent years by governmental action in the case of cholera, smallpox, typhus and plague. And coercion is obviously an essential part of this achievement, for in a matter of this sort the efforts of a vast and willing majority would be frustrated if a few careless or selfish people were allowed to make exceptions of themselves. Is it possible even to question that it is right by the rational coercion of a few into ways of hygiene to save thousands from disease and premature death and many more thousands from the sorrow and hardships of bereavement? Enforced hygiene, far from brutalizing, is probably the most effective way of educating the large class of people who ignore all precautions against infection because they do not believe in microbes which they do not see.

A still closer relationship of governmental coercion with ethical values is visible in the part played by legislation in industrial and social

reform. The conditions in which large masses of the population, especially in the large cities, are compelled to live, the precarious and scanty means of their livelihood, and often, too, the conditions under which they have to work are inimical to their moral and spiritual development. And it is becoming clear that these matters can be effectively dealt with only by legislation, and that legislation is morally the soundest way, for we are rightly told that what the poor need is not charity but justice, which indicates that under the circumstances the legal method is the only truly moral one. Since this is so, there is a growing conviction that in reformatory legislation we have an important and necessary element in the activities that make for the kingdom of God, whence it appears that in this important respect coercion is visibly the most efficient means of love.

And the consideration of particular cases shows how inevitable the element of coercion is in such reforms. In the case of cheap labour in the form of employment of young children, or length of hours of labour, or "sweating," we see that if any betterment is to be effected it must be enforced, otherwise those who use the unduly cheap labour will undersell and drive from the market those who do not. Christian employers have sometimes acknowledged that the wages they pay are not enough, but find that, in face of competition, if they pay more than others they will shortly cease to pay at all. Coercion in these cases is of the chivalrous sort that is not only good for those whom it protects but for those whose actions it controls. Booker Washington tells us that "the hurtful influences of" slavery "were not by any means

confined to the Negro": emancipation provided better moral conditions for both slave and master. The same is true of all legislation that secures juster conditions between employer and employed. It is not morally detrimental to the employer of labour to be compelled to pay his workers a living wage or to provide healthy conditions of work even when he does not want to: the penalization of the employment of child labour in mines and mills has not brutalized the mine- and mill-owners. It must be remembered that in these cases legal compulsion has the truly chivalrous element of cost to those who are ultimately responsible for it, for in the long run the cost of healthy conditions and a living wage falls not upon the employer but upon the consumer, who is the voter.

It is to be noted that legislation of the various sorts mentioned has generally been begun in face of strong opposition and therefore with a considerable use of compulsion, but that the opposition has declined as the scheme has shown itself to be workable and has ultimately been transformed into cheerful compliance. This common sequence shows that compulsion is an effective element in a very valuable sort of education. It is clear here that compulsion may be needful for the education even of well-meaning people; for, given the possibility of some reform which in order to be effective must be complied with by all, it will be obstructed by well-meaning people who do not believe that it will do what it promises until by being compulsorily imposed upon all it proves that it can.

We have already seen something of the

difficulties in which the man who condemns all use of coercion is placed by his dependence upon governmental activities for the maintenance of order and for the provision of other conditions needful or helpful to moral development. The modern growth of corporate activity increases the difficulty.

A consistent condemnation of all sorts of coercion would involve abstention from the use of any facility not to be had without it. It would involve disuse of all roads, railways, municipal drainage and water supply, of all commodities whose manufacture or distribution depends upon these facilities, and of all investments and financial transactions involving or dependent on legal rights. Consistent witness to the wrongfulness of coercion can be made only by one who stands entirely outside all existing society. It is not enough for him to say that if all were as he is, these things could be had without coercion : the fact remains that these cannot be had *now* without coercion, and to use them now is to consent to the coercion without which they cannot be had.

In the same way, since to legislate is to coerce, those who condemn all coercion cannot consistently take part in legislation for social or industrial betterment. So far therefore as they are concerned, it may be effectively opposed or indefinitely delayed. No one will deny the contention that it would be better if reforms could be achieved by a unanimous recognition of them as just and good, but whether and when such recognition will come is an unanswerable question, and in the meantime we have to ask whether we are justified in not using such means as are at our disposal.

Would it be better to wait until everyone had sufficient knowledge and public spirit to put into effective practice the precautions necessary in the case of infectious disease? Would it have been better to allow the continuation of child labour until all employers voluntarily abstained from it? Have we no obligation to those who in the meantime are morally handicapped by the conditions involved? And how can that obligation be effectively discharged but by legislation? But to use legislation for these ends is an acknowledgment that coercion is in certain circumstances the only effective implement of good will.

The insuperable difficulties involved in the condemnation of all coercion are perhaps most obvious in connection with the now common privilege of the franchise. To use the vote is to participate in the appointment of a representative to a legislative assembly, the characteristic of which is that its decisions are penally enforced. To desist from voting for the candidate who bids fair to make the best use of this power is to contribute to the appointment of one who will make a worse use of it. So that the very possession of the vote puts a man in a position where, if he votes, he gives direct sanction to coercion by helping to appoint a man to the assembly that uses it, or, if he does not vote, his desisting implies that it does not matter how it is used. And here we are brought again to see the fundamental weakness of this attitude: the condemnation of all coercion implies that so far as results go it is immaterial whether coercion is used justly or unjustly, selfishly or unselfishly.

The real point at issue comes here then, that

those who are convinced of the necessity and rightness of some use of coercion see in the way in which corporate coercion is used one of the greatest possibilities of good and evil. They feel the utmost importance of doing all that is possible to secure that this instrument shall be used wisely and beneficently. They resent an interpretation of the teaching of Jesus which makes it inconsistent for the followers of Jesus to take part in governmental activities, which is a sphere where public good imperatively needs good men, especially since there are those in the state eager to make government a tool of class or private ends. And they cannot but recognize that a doctrine which condemns all coercion as wrong and incapable of producing good does not help towards the better use of it but rather assists in obliterating moral distinctions in its use.

We shall have to return to this issue when dealing with modern war, but in the meantime it may be well here to remind those who are convinced of the necessity of a certain use of coercion, that this conviction brings its responsibilities. It brings the duty of using all endeavours to secure that the coercion involved in civil government shall be used efficiently, wisely and fairly. And since one of the strongest justifications of legal coercion is that it supplies the conditions necessary for moral and cultural development, there comes with the acceptance of its use the duty to be active in promoting these higher ends. And since also the use of coercion is subservient to higher human relationships our duty to the criminal does not end with punishing him, even when we are convinced that punishment is a necessary element in

his reform. All other possible redemptive means must be taken. Still less, of course, does the existence of law as a deterrent fulfil our duty towards the possible criminal. We are using legal coercion wrongly unless the security and release which it brings are used by us for the discovery and removal of conditions that foster crime, for the spread of truth and increase of beauty, and for the creation of means to fellowship. It must be a point of honour that those who enjoy the facilities provided by corporate activity should see that the coercion involved is minimized, i.e., does not fall unjustly on any individual or class, and that the facilities are efficiently provided and fairly distributed.

It may here be noted that a useful criterion for the wise and beneficent use of corporate coercion, and indeed of coercion of any sort, may be drawn from the early history of law. We saw that its beginning was the imposition of limits upon individual vengeance: coercion was exercised by the community to minimize it amongst individuals. In this important and characteristic instance corporate coercion received its justification because it diminished the sum total of coercion; and it would therefore seem that one important rule in the right use of coercion is that it should secure its own diminishing. Any form of coercion that has opposite results must be carefully examined and readjusted. For instance, although it is undoubted that the enforcement of the laws of property lessened the amount of coercion that existed in earlier and more lawless times, yet recent industrial and social developments have resulted in the fact that the present conditions

of private ownership have produced an extension of the coercion of nature. It is a law of nature that "if a man will not work, neither shall he eat," but under the present industrial system the law of property frequently condemns him to hunger whether he is willing to work or not. Here, then, seems a call for readjustment. The detailed application of this criterion cannot be attempted here, but it will be found of service in considering our duty in the question of war, to the consideration of which under modern conditions we must now turn.

(3)

When we come to consider the ethics of resistance and non-resistance in connection with modern inter-state relationships, it may perhaps be suggested at the outset that, whatever may have been the justification of war at certain primitive stages of human development, those conditions no longer obtain.

We saw, for instance, the part played by organized force in defending settled life against destruction by nomad incursion, which involved the defence of women and children against violence and of the means of subsistence and culture for all. We saw, too, that at a certain stage no rule was effective for order unless it was clothed with a sacredness which put upon its subjects the duty of defending it against external interference. But it may be argued that these two conditions no longer exist. Defence of women and children and means of order and culture are never, it may be contended, the real motive of modern war. A country that refused to use arms would not

be likely, at the hands of any great modern state, to suffer slaughter or slavery or starvation or even the loss of means of culture. And the idea of a divine right of kings may safely be said to be no longer necessary to effective internal government.

But it must be remembered that civilization is still fringed with uncivilized peoples, who are never thought of as possible wreckers of the world's order and civilization only because the superiority of civilized arms has made this unthinkable. For it is generally recognized that Europe was not made secure against nomad incursion until the technical skill and apparatus needed for the manufacture of fire-arms gave decided military advantage to the civilized; and this gain must be set against the appalling destructiveness of modern weapons.

And although the divine right of kings has gone, it is only because it has been superseded by the sacredness of liberty and the sacred duty of self-government. It is probable that the effectiveness of government for the maintenance of order does not to-day depend so directly upon the sentiment of the sacredness of liberty and self-government as in certain earlier times it depended upon the divine right of rulers, but it is also probable that the modern sentiment is a very valuable, if not necessary, element in the moral development of a people at the stage at which it appears. Of this we shall see more at a later point, but it is necessary to remember that, whatever modification there may be in this sentiment, it affects only one aspect of the question and that not the most fundamental, for the fact

still remains that in any civic order short of a world order internal government has as its concomitant the possibility of war.

Every state must be prepared either to defend itself against, or to submit to, aggression and dictation from without, either to lose independence or to make it good by force of arms. And the surrender of its independence would not obviate war, for sooner or later it would be compelled to fight for the state to which it had surrendered or at least to supply wealth for military purposes. And this state of things must continue so long as there are in the world separate states independent of any effective inter-state control.

Until we have firmly grasped the fact that there can be no government without the exercise of legal coercion and that, under present conditions, i.e., in the absence of any effective inter-state control, there can be no government without the possibility of war, we cannot really appreciate the issues involved in the pacifist attitude and the nature of the controversy between him and those who differ from him. And it is probable that, even with those who object to all coercion, war is really the core of their objection, while it often seems as though the objection to other forms of coercion is only part of the endeavour to find theoretical justification for the objection to war or to elaborate an inclusive scheme of conduct consistent with their refusal to participate in war. But both those who condemn all coercion and those who allow penal law but condemn all participation in war have to face the inevitable condition of the world as it is at present,—that without the possibility of war civil government is impossible.

The appalling destructiveness of modern war and the command that its horrors and sufferings have over the imagination and sympathy may move the sensitive to ask whether the benefits of coercive legislation are not too dear at the price of possible wars. But it must be remembered that the suffering and death caused by all the European wars for the last hundred years are small, probably negligibly small, compared with the amount of suffering and death prevented during the last fifty years by compulsory governmental measures dealing with infectious diseases.

It may here be noted that however great the advantage that the weapons of modern civilized peoples have over those of older times, there is no reason to suppose that when two modern armies meet the casualties are more numerous or severe than when two ancient armies of a similar size met: the greatest slaughters seem to belong rather to battles fought mainly with hand weapons. In so far as modern war is more destructive than ancient it is due rather to the higher organization of the states involved, and is therefore an inevitable concomitant of the increased possibilities of government for good.

But apart from the balance that appears when we weigh the good of governmental prevention of disease against the suffering and death due to war, the really important moral consideration is that civil government alone seems able to supply certain conditions necessary for moral development.

It may be said that no inter-state difference between civilized countries would, if one of them refused to fight, jeopardize such order as is neces-

sary for the moral development of its people, that a subject country is no more likely to be ill-policed than an independent one, and that therefore it is not necessary to defend political independence for the sake of moral values. Probably the premises of this contention are generally true, and it is possible to conceive a case in which the conclusion might be true. But a nation that for moral reasons refused to fight when its independence was threatened would be in a state of moral development which has not yet been reached by any state in the world, while one that, for other reasons, refused to defend its independence would be morally far behind the general level of the modern world. Cases may no doubt be cited in which peoples at a comparatively low stage of development have been subjugated by a more highly developed race and seem to have benefited morally by the experience, but it is very doubtful whether this would have resulted if the lower race had not had qualities which made them resist the invader as long as possible. In the case of peoples on a higher level of civilization it is often difficult to say whether the loss of political independence is the cause or result of moral deterioration, but the two are generally found together.

Most civilized nations to-day seem to be at a stage of development at which political independence is not morally a matter of indifference. This must be recognized if we would do justice to the part that ideal values play in modern war. Just so far as corporate activity of the governmental sort is found to be necessary or helpful to ideal ends, just to that degree the maintenance of political self-determination becomes a duty. In

proportion as ideals of corporate activity are dear to a community it will strive to keep its freedom of action. And we have seen something of the extent to which the desire for the common good finds in government one of its most effective and necessary instruments.

And free political institutions are also of moral value indirectly. The exercise of political responsibilities is a moral discipline. The existence of free political institutions is a constant call to the individual to extend his concern beyond the narrow circle of self and family and class to the larger ones of the nation and the world. Under self-government public service and political activity afford a large field for the exercise and therefore for the growth of the desire for the common good.

And with the growing interrelatedness of the various states of the world each one has a growing share and responsibility in this related whole; and its contribution in certain important respects, especially so far as ideals of government are concerned, cannot be made without the maintenance of independence. In a special sense the future of the world is here at stake. For in view of the increasing international connectedness of a non-political sort it is clear that either the political oneness of the world must follow or political differences will disintegrate and disrupt the human unity that is being knit up by these other ways. And the world can achieve political unity in only two ways, by the military hegemony of a power or group of powers, or by the voluntary agreement of states to an inter-state constitution that shall leave all equally free. And since it is clear that the second only could satisfy the modern spirit

and provide a permanent solution of the problem, there follows the necessity that, if the world's most pressing problem is to be efficiently solved, all free nations must preserve their freedom in face of any attempt at military dominance by any one power or group of powers.

It thus appears that political independence is an essential in the moral development of all nations at the upper levels of modern civilization. And though there may be individuals who are convinced that they have themselves attained a moral level at which they can dispense with this condition, we may, without questioning the validity of their conviction, maintain that they have no right to abstain from assisting in the maintenance of what is necessary for the moral development of the overwhelming majority of their fellows.

It may perhaps be asked why, if political independence is so important a factor in moral development, Jesus did not support the Jewish spirit of revolt against Rome. The answer seems to be twofold:

(1) The Jewish longing for independence in the time of Jesus lacked just those elements that make it ethically valuable for a nation. Its motive does not seem to have been the desire to achieve social or moral or religious ideals balked by foreign dominance: it certainly was not the desire to serve the world of Gentiles, for the Jewish national ideal was rather to destroy or subjugate the Gentile nations. The justice of this conclusion is reflected in the unlovely story of their resistance to Rome when it at last broke out. If we compare that war with the Maccabaean revolt against Antiochus we shall see a significant difference.

(2) The Jews were at that time in a unique position. The story of Jesus' life and the record of his words give us to understand that he knew himself to be living at a critical and unique moment of the world's history. The Jews only of all the nations in the then known world had a living religion. With the interpretation that Jesus brought to it, their religion was lifted from being the highest existing national religion to be the supreme universal religion. The world needed a religion and was sliding to ruin for lack of it. So that there was a clear call for Israel to fulfil the greatest and most glorious destiny ever set before a people, to save the world by giving it the truth. In the active fulfilment of this destiny no power to coerce was required. Political independence was not necessary now as it had been at earlier stages of Israel's religious development; for though their religion had grown to its unequalled height because it was so intensely national and patriotic, yet when the point came where it developed into an essentially universal religion, it is obvious that their great achievement and contribution to the world was then past the need of political independence. On the other hand, the basis of order was secured by Rome, whose rule also offered the invaluable practical facility of safe travel and easy communication. No other nation has ever had religious genius in a pre-eminence that marks it for such a destiny as that to which Jesus called Israel: none has reached a point at which its supreme service to the world lies in a national growth of truth which the world needs and has not. As a matter of fact it is highly unlikely, if not essentially impossible, that

any nation will ever again be in the position in which Israel was in the time of Jesus. So that there is good reason to hold that his attitude to the Jewish movement for political independence reflects what was unique in the situation rather than his estimate of the worth of political independence generally.

When therefore people ask amazedly and hopelessly, "How comes it that at this date A.D. nations, at least nominally Christian, fight one another?" we have to remember that the defence of liberty is the concomitant of self-government and that Christianity has undoubtedly increased the desire for self-determination: that the ideal aims of statesmanship need the autonomy of the state for their fulfilment and that Christianity has fostered these ideal aims. It is significant that the series of would-be and partly successful world-empires that terminated with the marvellous achievement of Rome has found no counterpart in Christendom. Every attempt of any one state to dominate the world has been resisted with a universality and persistence of spirit not observable in the pre-Christian world. Christianity has undoubtedly made freedom dearer to man and induced man to make greater sacrifices for it.

Despite the presence of other and less worthy motives, practically all modern wars have behind them the sense of a duty to protect or promote this power of autonomy. They nearly all turn directly upon matters connected with the power of a state to defend itself from attack or maintain its self-determination. Even aggressive wars are for easily defended frontiers, places of strategic value, increase of national resources, i.e., for some-

thing that contributes to security from foreign pressure. This is, of course, seldom the only motive, but it is one without which a military policy of any sort would be unable to commend itself to the common conscience of most modern civilized peoples.

We have also to consider that in the absence of any inter-state power that can secure to every state such self-determination as is morally necessary, each state is left to secure its own and is therefore constantly in danger of being brought into conflict with other states, a danger that increases with all that modern civilization does to bring peoples more and more into contact with each other. A state that always gave way would sooner or later be absorbed by other states, and its people would lose the power of corporate self-determination and would sacrifice all that had been acquired of the conditions and possibilities of governmental activity for ideal ends. It would surrender one of the most efficient means to common good.

Occasions of conflict are made more frequent because every state has to judge for itself what is right. In the absence of such means as an inter-state court to correct a wrong idea of what is right and to decide when it is right for one state to give way to the claims of another, cases are bound to arise in which each side is honestly convinced that itself is right and its opponent wrong. To give way always would be suicidal, especially since we have seen that international disputes nearly always concern matters that directly or indirectly touch those interests of independence and autonomy that are of high moral value. And

thus we may have a state of things in which many a Christian on both sides of an inter-state difference can find no other course of duty but to fight. And yet he finds himself shoulder to shoulder with those whose aims are on the whole more antagonistic to his own than are the aims of some of those against whom he fights. But here we must take into account what we saw to be inevitable in all corporate activity, that because it must represent the average of moral development it is bound to be to some extent uncongenial to the best.

It becomes clear that the persistence of war in modern civilization is due to a large extent to the influence of Christian ideals in the absence of inter-state judicature. It was thought by some at one time that the proof that war did not pay would stop war: it is to the credit of the world that it did not.

But it must be borne in mind that there are predatory and militarist elements in every state which, in the absence of any inter-state court, find it only too easy to give respectable colour to their schemes. The false patriotism that seeks its country's wealth and power by all means fair or foul is thus often able to obscure the difference between itself and the true patriotism that values political independence as a moral condition and means to the ideal. Both need that their country should be strong: both are interested in repelling aggression from without: both can use in this respect only the constituted force of their state, and this concurrence of means gives the sinister element a great opportunity of masking under moral features.

Both the moral value of political independence and the presence in states of men and classes who would use the coercive power of the state for low ends, must be taken into account when we judge the practical issue between the pacifist and those who differ from him with regard to war. We have seen that those who are persuaded that coercion is in certain circumstances necessary and right are convinced that the public good depends greatly upon the right use of coercion, and if this is so with legal coercion much more is it so in the case of war. They feel the imperative necessity of preventing their country's entry upon an unrighteous war, of exhausting every pacific means before resorting to arms, of using their state's influence for the best in differences in which it is not directly involved, and especially of moving the state to create and foster all such inter-state relationships as permanently diminish or abolish the possibilities of war. They know that in these aims they have to struggle against the militarist and aggressive elements in their own state. They see that every good man who will have nothing to do with the state's exercise of coercion increases the proportionate power of those who would make evil use of it. They see that a doctrine that involves the denial that there is any difference in moral effect between one use of coercion and another must undermine the endeavours of those who, convinced that there is an immeasurable difference between a just and an unjust war, would do everything to withhold their state from the latter. They see that to deny that might can serve right plays into the hands of those who believe in might only, that so far as pacifists succeed in persuading people that the teaching of

Jesus involves the condemnation of all coercion they tend to destroy the authority of his spirit over those who are persuaded that some coercion is inevitable and so to minimize his influence over their use of it. So that the issue cannot but be acute.

The pacifist may reply that he makes his own contribution to the state in the lessening of evil. But this really begs the question. So far as he is a good man he does, like all good men, undoubtedly assist in many ways to the lessening of evil in the state. But, as a pacifist, he stands, not for the superiority of love over hate, for on that point all Christians are agreed, but for the universal applicability and obligation of non-resistance as the method of love and for the condemnation of all coercion. And those who differ from him cannot regard this as a contribution to the end they seek, but rather as the reverse. The condemnation of all use of coercion undoubtedly tends, where it has any influence at all, to divert moral endeavour from the service and support of government. And this explains the acuteness of the controversy in time of war.

When it is recognized that war is the inevitable concomitant of civil government in a world where there is no effective inter-state judicature, we seem to see what is needed in order to eliminate war or at least to reduce it to a minimum. The establishment of an inter-state court and executive which should do for the states of the world what our law courts do for the individual (i.e., prevent unjust coercion and settle differences impartially) would secure sufficient autonomy for moral ends, would provide a binding decision in cases of disputed

right and would at a stroke remove the sense of insecurity that is at the bottom of nine-tenths of modern wars.

It is sometimes contended that the practicability of such a court will be for ever made impossible by the increase of population, which will compel the more rapidly increasing nations to aggression against those that are stationary or decreasing. This objection cannot be fully discussed here, but certain considerations may be suggested:—

(1) Even if it were not possible to eliminate wars due to increasing population, these are by no means the only wars, and if wars from other causes can be eliminated surely it is worth every effort.

(2) War as the result of increasing population has as its aim not merely the provision of means of subsistence for surplus population but so to provide it as not to lose them as citizens, i.e., as possible soldiers, which can be done only by acquiring more territory; without this complication the problem of population could often be solved by emigration to other countries, and the complication would be removed when fear of insecurity was removed. It is thus fear of defeat in war that makes a state try to solve its problem of over-population by war. It is true that some countries hinder alien immigration, but this again is due largely to alien animosities or to the fear that war may find them with a large section of population alien in sympathy.

(3) The numbers killed in war cannot solve the problem of population, for they are comparatively insignificant compared with the constant factors of accident and disease. And the small contribution

that war makes directly to the problem is a bad one, for it kills off those who are physically fittest. If the contention that we must let war go on because of its contribution to the problem of overpopulation is a valid one, it would seem still more reasonable to disallow certain precautions against infectious diseases, for that would permit a factor to work which would decrease numbers by weeding out the sickliest. So long as war stops short of the extermination of the conquered, it does little to solve the problem of overpopulation: it can only determine along which of other possible lines it shall be determined. And it does not seem impossible that this determination might be made without war and made more wisely. There is no more reason why the fact that nations increase at varying rates should inevitably produce war despite any inter-state judicature that might be devised than there is that the fact that provinces increase at different rates should produce civil war within the state. The varying increase within the state undoubtedly produces struggle of a sort, but it is of a sort much less destructive and irrational than war.

(4) The fear of overpopulation of the world is a remote one. It cannot in any case become acute for many generations, and even supposing that then only war could settle it, much will be gained in the meantime by avoiding a method which destroys the best first. And with regard to the possibility of overpopulation two considerations must be noted:—

(a) In thickly populated countries the majority of the people are gathered in large cities, and this concentration produces a fall in the ratio of increase

so that in many cases the population of great cities appears to be maintained rather by immigration from the country districts than by its own births. So that there would seem to be an automatic check upon increase when it reaches a certain point of density.

(b) With increasing culture the birth rate is found to decrease. This appears to be a law operative throughout the whole animal world. Sutherland, in his *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, has pointed out the connection in the animal world between increasing intelligence and diminishing fecundity. Great fecundity is only one means of survival and that a costly one, which is curtailed as soon as growing intelligence allows greater parental care. The decreasing birth rate that comes with culture does not necessarily mean physical degeneracy, any more than the low fecundity of mammals proves them vitally inferior to fishes. So that here too we have a factor that may assist in the solution of the population problem.

It is sometimes contended that struggle is an essential element of life and one that plays a great part in the development of moral fibre, and that therefore it is both impossible and undesirable to eliminate war. But though struggle is probably an inevitable element of life and is certainly a factor in moral growth, it is also true that man has a certain amount of control over the form which the struggle shall take and that all kinds of struggle are not of equal moral benefit. The general condition of life is that, though certain fundamental elements of it cannot be eliminated, man has almost endless power to modify and substitute, and that in this manipulation lies a great part of the art

of life. There is no reason in the nature of things why war should not be treated as duelling and lynching and club-law and brigandage and piracy and other undesirable forms of struggle have been treated in all civilized countries.

And it is clear that it is often of the highest gain to substitute one sort of struggle for another. It may be necessary to abstain from one for the sake of another : "I will bite no dog," says the sheep-dog in a Bohemian proverb, "for I must save my teeth for the wolf." War, like any other occupation, fosters certain moral qualities, but from this point of view it is probably one of the least productive and most dangerous of all legalized struggles: the Great War does not seem to have left any marked moral improvement behind it. Duelling, prize-fighting, street fights, rioting, faction fights are continually suppressed without apparent loss of moral fibre to the community. The struggle of life has, apart from war, opportunities enough for learning physical courage, discipline, comradeship, self-sacrifice ; and war conditions rather suppress than encourage the higher qualities of moral courage, intellectual honesty, impartiality of judgment. War is at this time of day an obsolete schoolmaster likely only to teach his pupils much that they will have to unlearn in better schools than his.

Then it is sometimes said that, human nature being what it is, we cannot hope to abolish war. But precisely the same objection might have been urged with still more force against any attempt to prevent individuals from settling their differences by blows. It is perfectly possible to give the inherent combativeness of human nature ample

scope apart from war: in fact the vast majority of men in all modern generations do normally get it otherwise. Racial antagonisms when roused are no doubt strong, but not stronger than individual antagonisms, so that, in view of the effectiveness of law courts in every civilized country, it is more than absurd to say that, human nature being what it is, an effective inter-state court is impossible.

And there are considerations that go to show that such an inter-state control, far from being impossible, is in the direct line of historic development. And there are signs that present conditions make such a step both possible and necessary in the near future.

The needs of moral life and development in all parts of the world have demanded and secured that the right to coerce should be relegated to one central authority for each community. The size of the community capable of being included under one such authority depends on its level of civilization and ethics, on its acquisitions in means of communication, on the degree to which people are capable of discipline, sympathy, imagination and spirit of public service. The fulfilment of this ethical need has thus with increasing civilization been found in progress from smaller to larger political units. The subdivisions of many states to-day are reminiscent of earlier and smaller autonomous districts. The progress to larger units has been of advantage in abolishing the possibility of war between the component parts, which would otherwise only be increased by betterment of communication and organization. It may be said that this has taken place at the cost of political independence, which has been maintained to be needful

for moral development. But in this connection it is well to note that in the two most significant political growths of modern times, the United States of America and the British Empire, we have really a federation of separate states, united for certain purposes but retaining self-government so far as internal interests are concerned to a degree as adequate for moral ends as if they had entire independence. In addition to this the component states are freed from the possibility of war with each other and thus gain a considerable degree of security, while as comparatively free parts of a larger whole they can make a far more effective contribution to the world's need than if they were isolated.

The logic of history indicates only one end to this tendency to ever larger and larger states and federations of states, i.e., a world-embracing collaboration of all states in the creation of an inter-state institution for the taking over of such functions of government as can be best so administered, amongst the chief of which would be the establishment of a legislative assembly and court of justice with executive power, whose office would be to do for the states of the world what they themselves do for their subjects in the matter of keeping peace, providing protection against aggression and settling differences.

The possibility of such a solution is shown in the growing recognition of the need of introducing more definite canons of right and wrong into international custom. All belligerent states find themselves obliged to justify their cause in the public opinion of the world and are sensitive to its strictures ; they always endeavour to convince their own subjects

and others that their cause is the cause of humanity. Another indication of the same sort is found in the common conviction of the evil of militarism.

Amongst other factors making in the same direction we may number the following:—

(1) The growingly cosmopolitan nature of culture and the result of increased means of communication in emphasizing the supernational nature of such interests as literature, music, art, science, philosophy, religion.

(2) International commerce more and more evinces the interrelatedness of the interests of one country's prosperity with that of another. The commercial machine is composed of parts belonging to various countries and the damage of one means obstruction for all.

(3) The discovery that certain important matters of health and morals must be handled internationally if they are to be handled effectively.

(4) The growing impossibility of confining war to the parties immediately concerned in the difference from which it arises, and of confining its effects to belligerent states.

(5) The growing organization of civilized countries tends to increase the proportion of human and material resources which they put into a war, with the result that the extent of the forces involved makes rapid decision impossible and reduces the contest to one of attrition, in which the victor is almost as exhausted as the vanquished. To this must be added that in such warfare it becomes important to starve the civil population and impede the making of munitions by the destruction of cities, while the growing efficiency of explosives

and aircraft make the horrid possibilities of the latter boundless.

Modern conditions thus not only pave the way for an international legislature but make it imperatively necessary that some institution of the sort should be established speedily. And within recent years two important movements have been made which give ground for hope and material for determining individual duty and the direction in which effort is needed.

We have first the number of arbitration treaties that have of late years been concluded between various states. This is a first step to an inter-state court, for an arbitration treaty practically establishes an international court with very limited jurisdiction. It has of course no executive power, but its value despite this lack is a hopeful consideration. For it means that the value of an arbitration treaty depends upon the reliability of the honour of the contracting parties and the force of the public opinion of the world ; and if contracts are worth making on this basis, we have evidence that moral considerations are becoming a power in inter-state affairs in a way which promises greater things in future.

The practical possibility of arbitration affords guidance in the question as to whether in any particular case an individual ought to support his state in war, for it seems to provide the only reasonable and applicable criterion as to when war is justifiable. The old division of offensive and defensive wars is no longer useful: an adequate defence may necessitate the taking of the offensive. And between modern civilized powers the category of "just" and "unjust" in the undertaking of

war is almost impossible to apply, for no war is ever undertaken by any of them without the plea that it is a just war, and probably most of those who make the plea make it honestly; to which we must add that the private person is seldom allowed such full possession of the facts as is necessary for an assured judgment. It would seem therefore that until an inter-state court comes into being the Christian can best serve the world by refusing to support or fight in any cause in which his country does not seek arbitration and by supporting it in any cause that seems just when the opposing power refuses the offer of arbitration.

The other important movement is the establishment of the League of Nations. It is the beginning of such an inter-state court as alone can solve the problem of inter-state differences without war. No doubt an enormous extension of power and scope is needed to make it effective to this end: it must be made competent to deal with all inter-state disputes and to enforce its decisions. It may be necessary to reshape or replace it by a more efficient institution, but it is the clear duty of all men of good will in all countries to press their governments and to influence opinion in the direction of securing such an institution as shall be capable of guaranteeing states against aggression and of giving effective judgment in cases of dispute. The existence of such an inter-state control would at once remove inter-state fear and suspicion. It would make it as easy for nation to love nation as for fellow-citizens to love each other. It seems therefore to be the next important step to be taken by corporate activity on the way to the kingdom of God.

Such an institution would fulfil the criterion for coercion by diminishing the sum total of its use in the case of states as much as the establishment of law in tribe or nation diminished it within their own limits.

The condemner of all coercion must condemn the establishment of an inter-state court with power to enforce its decisions. He repudiates this endeavour to bring about a cessation of wars. The only alternative that he has to suggest is that all Christians should refuse to fight, which, he claims, would compel governments to find other ways of settling their differences and so would bring a cessation of all wars. We have already discussed the question as to whether this refusal would always be morally right, and we have now merely to ask whether it would be effective in stopping war. What would actually happen? Suppose the case of two countries contemplating war. If both had an approximately equal number of those who refused to fight, it would not alter the balance and therefore would not act as a deterrent: indeed it might have the opposite effect, because, a smaller proportion of the nation being available for war purposes, the risk involved in war would be less and would therefore be more readily undertaken. But if in one country there were many more that refused to fight than in the other, so many in fact as to prevent war, the government of that country would be compelled to yield to all the demands of its opponent and would thus become politically subservient to it, if not absorbed by it. This would mean that the countries that produced most of those who refused to fight would one by one be reduced to the position of tributaries to the more militarist states. Such a

method would result in the utmost prolongation of war, for it would mean that the nations with the greatest repugnance to war would gradually fall into political insignificance, leaving the control of the world in the hands of the fighting races. And militarist dominance would create conditions inimical to the development of Christian life and would continue as long as there were enough of its partisans to man the administration. Nor does the history of pacifism allow the expectation that its spread will be rapid: it has shown nothing like the rapidity of the anti-slave movement.

The parent knows that the discipline of the home is a needful step in the child's progress to understanding and accepting the truth and rule of Christ, and that to omit that discipline because he shrinks from its sternness is to sin against love. The history of human progress shows us that a law imposed by the community upon the individual was a needful step in the moral growth that flowered in Jesus Christ. He declared himself the fulfiller of the law, and we see how it provided and still provides the base necessary for his work, while he gives the spirit and life without which corporate activity grows corrupt and incompetent. And the endeavour after an inter-state court relies upon the same relationship with the spiritual, for a world order is the essential complement of Christianity as a world religion and is an essential condition for the true expression of Christianity in the larger life of the world; while the establishment and permanence and effectiveness of such a world order depend upon the presence in the world of a sufficient spirit of service, which is the spirit of Jesus Christ.

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